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WORKPLACE SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW
IN CANADA AND THE UNITED
STATES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
OF THE DOCTRINAL
DEVELOPMENT CONCERNING THE
NATURE OF ACTIONABLE SEXUAL
HARASSMENT
Joseph M. Pellicciottii
I. INTRODUCTION
This article reviews the general development of workplace
sexual harassment laws in Canada and the United States, fo-
cusing upon the doctrinal development of actionable sexual har-
assment. Particularly, the article highlights the doctrinal
development in Canada since the Canadian Supreme Court's
1989 landmark sexual harassment decision, Janzen v. Platy En-
terprises Ltd.,1 and in the United States since 1986 when the
United States Supreme Court decided its first sexual harass-
ment case, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson.2
By employing a comparative approach, this article seeks to
determine the association of Canadian doctrine to that of the
United States. Since American courts were the first of the two
t Associate Professor of Public & Environmental Affairs; Assistant Dean, In-
diana University School of Public & Environmental Affairs; and Division Director,
Indiana University Northwest Division of Public & Environmental Affairs and
Political Science. B.A., Alfred University, 1972; M.P.A., Syracuse University,
1973; J.D., Cum Laude, Gonzaga University, 1976.
The author wishes to extend his appreciation to Ms. Suzanne Tourigny, Head
of Library Services for the Canadian Human Rights Commission, and Ms. Diane
Teeple and Ms. Judith Rubin, of the Supreme Court of Canada Library, for making
their organizations' library facilities available for use in researching this article in
Ottawa. The research which was conducted in Canada for this article was sup-
ported with funding through the Canadian Studies Research Grant Program of the
Canadian Embassy.
1 59 D.L.R.4th 352, 10 C.H.R.R. D/6205 (Can. 1989).
2 477 U.S. 57 (1986), aff'd Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985),
rev'd 23 Fair Empl. Cas. (BNA) 37 (D.D.C. 1980).
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nations to recognize workplace sexual harassment as illegal sex
discrimination, 3 they have been in a position to influence the
decisions of the Canadian courts. Therefore, in determining the
doctrinal relationship of the law between the two jurisdictions,
this article specifically marks a general influence of United
States law upon workplace sexual harassment law develop-
ments in Canada.
The article begins with a brief overview of the constitu-
tional and statutory bases for the prohibition of workplace sex-
ual harassment in Canada. Then, it will sketch the early
development of Canadian and United States workplace sexual
harassment law by reviewing the decisions of the courts. The
article will also survey the human rights tribunals, review the
Janzen and Vinson decisions of the high courts of the respective
countries and proceed to consider the doctrinal development
concerning the nature of actionable sexual harassment in the
post-Janzen and post-Vinson periods. Throughout the paper,
the focus is upon the commonalities and differences of Canadian
and United States law regarding actionable workplace sexual
harassment.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
BASES FOR THE PROHIBITION OF WORKPLACE SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN CANADA
A. Canada's Constitutional Guarantee of Equal Rights
The Canadian Constitution Act of 1982 includes the Cana-
dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.4 The Charter entrenches
3 See infra text accompanying notes 59-92.
4 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11 [hereinafter
Charter]. The Charter was effective April 17, 1982, except for Section 15, which
had a delayed effective date of April 17, 1985. Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), c.11,
§ 32(2). The Canadian Constitution is "the supreme law of Canada, and any law
that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the
inconsistency, of no force or effect." Canada Act 1982 (U.K), 1982, c.11 § 52. This
language, of course, is similar to that found in the United States Constitution.
U.S. CONST. art. VI. However, unlike the United States Constitution, the Char-
ter includes a "notwithstanding" clause allowing the federal Parliament or any of
the provincial legislatures to declare that legislation "shall operate notwithstand-
ing a provision included in section 2 [Fundamental Freedoms] or sections 7
through 15 [Legal Rights and Equality Rights]" of the Charter. Canada Act 1982
(U.K.), 1982, c.11 § 33(1). Declarations made pursuant to the notwithstanding
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol8/iss2/3
19961 SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW IN CANADA & U.S. 341
a broad range of individual rights, categorized in terms of "fun-
damental rights,"5 "mobility rights,"6 "legal rights,"7 "demo-
cratic rights,"8 "equality rights"9 and "minority language
educational rights."10 Within the context of prohibiting work-
place sexual harassment, the equality rights fixed in section 15
of the Charter are material. The equality rights section pro-
vides the Canadian basis for the constitutional principle of
equal protection under the law, and the section expressly pro-
clause are limited to a five-year period. Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11 § 33(3).
Declarations under the clause may be re-enacted for another five-year period.
Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11 § 33(3).s. 33(3).
5 "Fundamental rights" include the freedoms of conscience and religion, the
freedom of "thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of press and
other media of communication," and the freedoms of peaceful assembly and associ-
ation. See Charter, supra note 4, § 2.
6 "Mobility rights" include, the rights of Canadians "to enter, remain in, and
leave Canada," and to move to and work in any province. See Charter, supra note
4, §§ 6(1)-(2). Mobility rights are subject to provincial residency requirements for
the receipt of social services. Charter, supra note 4, §§ 6(3). The mobility rights
section of the constitution does not preclude affirmative action programs designed
to ameliorate the conditions of socially or economically disadvantaged individuals,
if the rate of employment in a province is below the average Canadian employment
rate. Charter, supra note 4, §§ 6(4).
7 "Legal rights" include safeguards for life, liberty and security and the right
of an individual not to be deprived of life, liberty and security without "the princi-
ples of fundamental justice." Charter, supra note 4, § 7. Legal rights also include a
number of criminal procedural protections familiar to Americans, e.g., the right to
be secure against unreasonable search and seizure, the right not to be arbitrarily
detained or imprisoned, the right to counsel, the right to a speedy trial ("to be tried
within a reasonable time"), a privilege against self-incrimination (the right "not to
be compelled to be a witness in proceedings against that person in respect of the
offence"), the presumption of innocence, the right not to be subjected to cruel and
unusual punishment, the right not to be denied "reasonable bail without just
cause," and the protection against double jeopardy. See Charter, supra note 4,
§§ 8-14.
8 "Democratic rights" include the right of citizens to vote; a general five-year
limitation on the terms of both the federal and provincial legislatures; and the
requirement for legislatures to meet "at least once every twelve months." See
Charter, supra note 4 §§ 3-5.
9 "Equality rights" include the fundamental principle of equal protection
under the law and a broad prohibition of discrimination, particularly discrimina-
tion based on "race, national or ethnic origin, color, religion, sex, age, or mental or
physical disability." See Charter, supra note 4, § 15(1). See also, supra text accom-
panying note 11.
10 "Minority language educational rights" include the general guarantee that
French and English minority language education will be supported by public fund-
ing in both primary and secondary school instruction. See Charter, supra note 4,
§§. 23(1)-(2). French and English are established in the Charter as the official
languages of Canada. See Charter, supra note 4, § 16(1).
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hibits discrimination based on "race, national or ethnic origin,
colour, religion, sex, age, or mental or physical disability.""'
The nature of discrimination within the meaning of section
15 of the Charter was first considered by the Canadian Supreme
Court in 1989, in Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia.'2
In Andrews, the Court was explicit; to establish a claim under
section 15 of the Charter, individuals must demonstrate that
they belong to a "discrete and insular minority" which has his-
torically experienced discrimination, stereotyping or prejudice
by virtue of a physical characteristic.' 3  The Court also de-
scribed in Andrews the essence of the discrimination prohibited
by section 15:
... [Dliscrimination may be described as a distinction, whether
intentional or not but based on grounds relating to personal char-
acteristics of the individual or group, which has the effect of im-
posing burdens, obligations, or disadvantages on such individual
or group not imposed on others, or which withholds or limits ac-
cess to opportunities, benefits, and advantages available to other
members of society. Distinctions based on personal characteris-
tics attributed to an individual solely on the basis of association
with a group will rarely escape the charge of discrimination, while
those based on an individual's merits and capacities will rarely be
so classed. i4
11 Section 15 provides:
Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to
the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination
and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or eth-
nic origin, color, religion, sex, age, or mental or physical disability.
See Charter, supra note 4, § 15(1). Section 15(2) of the Charter protects the use of
affumative action programs from attack under § 15(1): "Subsection (1) does not
preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object the amelioration of
conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are disad-
vantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or
mental or physical disability." See Charter, supra note 4, § 15(2). Section 15 of the
Charter was given a delayed effective date of April 17, 1985. See Charter, supra
note 4. The purpose of the delay was to allow Canadian governments "to clean up
their laws and to prepare to defend the ones they were not willing to change."
MANDEL, THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND THE LEGALIZATION OF POLITICS IN CANADA
240 (1989).
12 1 S.C.R. 143 (1989).
13 Id. at 182. See also R. Turpin, 1 S.C.R. 1296, 1332-33 (1989).
14 Andrews, 1 S.C.R. at 174-75 (emphasis added). Canadian courts have also
interpreted human rights legislation consistent with the Charter's Section 15 defi-
nition. See Fortune v. Annapolis Dist. School Bd., 20 C.H.R.R. D/100, D/104 (N.S.
Bd. of Inq. 1992) ("Nova Scotia legislation must be interpreted consistent with the
[Vol. 8:339342
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Pursuant to section 1 of the Charter, enumerated rights
and freedoms are "subject only to such reasonable limits pre-
scribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society."15 Therefore, the language of section 1 im-
poses "reasonable" limits on the scope of the rights and free-
doms enumerated in the Charter, to the extent that such limits
"can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society."
As a practical matter, section 1 of the Charter recognizes that a
degree of judicial deference to legislative and administrative
policy choices is necessary. Whether a law challenged as viola-
tive of section 15 rights, or as violative of any of the other of the
Charter's enumerated rights, can find safe harbor within the
reasonable limits exception depends upon the result of a "well-
established" process of judicial inquiry.16 The inquiry initially
considers the objective of the legislation. The legislation subject
to judicial review "must be 'of sufficient importance to warrant
overriding a constitutionally protected right or freedom.'"17
This means that the purpose of the law "must relate to concerns
which are pressing and substantial in a free and democratic so-
requirements of § 15 of the Charter."). Under the definition, plaintiff "need not
find a deliberate, conscious decision" to discriminate. Fortune, 20 C.H.R.R. at D/
104. See also Re Ont. H. R. Comm'n. v. Simpsons-Sears Ltd., 23 D.L.R.4th 321,
329 (Can. 1985). Canada's acceptance of adverse effect discrimination parallels
the acceptance of the disparate impact theory in Title VII cases in the United
States. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Disparate impact the-
ory in the United States is now legislatively regulated. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-
2(k)(1)(A)(i) and (ii) (1989).
15 See Charter, supra note 4, § 1. A detailed discussion of the enumerated
rights in the Charter and a consideration of the nature of the § 1 reasonable limits
language are beyond the scope of this article. For an excellent analysis of the his-
tory and substance of the Constitution Act, 1982, including the rights enumerated
in the Charter, see PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA (1992). For
an illustrative review of the nature and scope of the Canadian constitution, includ-
ing the enumerated individual rights, see RONALD I. CHEFFINS & PATRICIA A. JOHN-
SON, THE REviSED CANADIAN CONSTITUON: POLrrIcs AND LAW (1986).
16 Leshner v. Ontario (No. 2), 16 C.H.R.R. D/184, 202 (Ont. Bd. of Inq. 1992)
(citations omitted) ("The elements of the § 1 [reasonable limits] inquiry are well-
established."). See also R. v. Oakes, 1 S.C.R. 103 (1986) (Oakes is the leading Ca-
nadian Supreme Court decision on the nature of the reasonable limits safe harbor;
the Court set out the procedure to be followed in deciding if legislation infringing
Charter rights can be justified under § 1). The standard for Section 1 inquiry is
commonly referred to as the Oakes test. See Ross v. New Brunswick School Dist.
No. 15 and Attis, 19 C.H.R.R. D/173, D/181 (N.B. Ct. of App. 1993).
17 Leshner, 16 C.H.R.R. at D/201.
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ciety."18 In addition, to reach safe harbor, it must be estab-
lished that "the means chosen are reasonable and demonstrably
justified."19 This is demonstrated by applying a three-part, pro-
portionality test. Under the test, the following components
must be established:
(i) the measure in question must be carefully designed to achieve
the objective in question and must not be arbitrary, unfair or
based on irrational considerations, but rather must be rationally
connected to the objective in question; (ii) the means, even if ra-
tionally connected to the objective, should impair as little as possi-
ble the right or freedom in question; and (iii) there must be a
proportionality between the effect of the measures which are re-
sponsible for limiting the Charter right or freedom and the objec-
tive which has been identified as being of 'sufficient importance'
20
Thus, to reach safe harbor via section 1 "there must be a ra-
tional connection, minimal impairment, and proportionality be-
tween the effect and the objective" of the law.2 '
The Charter applies to the actions of all Canadian legisla-
tures, whether the activities are performed by the federal Par-
liament or by a provincial or territorial legislature. 22 The
Charter additionally applies "to many forms of delegated legis-
lation, regulations, orders in council, possibly municipal by-
laws, and by-laws and regulations of other creatures of Parlia-
ment and the Legislatures." 23 The Charter reaches the execu-
tive and administrative activities of the various Canadian
governments. 24
However, the Charter does not reach purely private ac-
tion.25 In McKinney v. University of Guelph,26 the Canadian
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Leshner, 16 C.H.R.R. at D/202.
22 See Charter, supra note 4, § 32(1).
23 Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 580 v. Dolphin Deliv-
ery, 2 S.C.R. 573, 602 (1986).
24 Id. at 574.
25 Id. Dolphin Delivery is the leading authority. See also, Douglas/Kwantlen
Faculty Ass'n. v. Douglas College, 3 S.C.R. 570, 13 C.H.R.R. D/403 (Can. 1990);
Stoffman v. Vancouver General Hospital, 3 S.C.R. 483, 13 C.H.R.R. D/337 (Can.
1990); Harrison v. University of British Columbia, 3 S.C.R. 451, 13 C.H.R.R. D/317
(Can. 1990); McKinney v. University of Guelph, 3 S.C.R. 229, 13 C.H.R.R. D/171
FVol. 8:339
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Supreme Court explained, "[t]he exclusion of private activity
from the Charter was not the result of happenstance. It was a
deliberate choice which must be respected."2 7 The Court in Mc-
Kinney admitted that it did not know precisely why the ap-
proach was taken, however, it did suggest reasons for doing so:
Historically, bills of rights, of which that of the United States is
the great constitutional exemplar, have been directed at govern-
ment. Government is the body that can enact and enforce rules
and authoritatively impinge on individual freedom. Only govern-
ment requires to be constitutionally shackled to preserve rights of
the individual. Others, it is true, may offend against the rights of
individuals. This is especially true in a world in which economic
life is largely left to the private sector where powerful private in-
stitutions are not directly affected by democratic forces. But gov-
ernment can either regulate these or create distinct bodies for the
protection of human rights and the advancement of human
dignity.28
In Stoffman v. Vancouver General Hospital,2 9 the Canadian
Supreme Court set out the justification for limiting the applica-
tion of the Charter to governmental action with greater preci-
sion. In doing so, the Court also acknowledged the "undue
burden" which an application of the Charter to private conduct
would impose upon the courts.3 0 The reasons for the limitation,
the Court stated, include:
... the historical association of bills of rights with the struggle to
constrain the exceptional power of government to impose its will
upon the individual or minority groups; the belief that the values
which a bill of rights seeks to promote and protect can be better
(Can. 1990); Tremblay v. Daigle, 2 S.C.R. 573 (1989); Operation Dismantle Inc. v.
The Queen, 1 S.C.R. 441 (1985); R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., 1 S.C.R. 295 (1985);
Hunter v. Southam Inc., 2 S.C.R. 145 (1984). A discussion of the outer reach of the
Charter, i.e., to use the American terminology, the scope of Canadian "state ac-
tion," is beyond the scope of this article. See Anne McLellan & Bruce P. Elman, To
Whom Does the Charter Apply? Some Recent Cases on s. 32, 24 ALTA. L. REV. 361
(1986). See generally PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA (1992).
26 3 S.C.R. 229, 13 C.H.R.R. D/171 (Can. 1990).
27 13 C.H.R.R. at D/183-84 (LaForest, J., for the Court).
28 Id. Of course, U.S. law, with its "state action" requirement, also precludes
the application of constitutional protections to purely private action. See, Shelley
v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
29 3 S.C.R. 483, 13 C.H.R.R. D/337 (Can. 1990).
30 13 C.H.R.R. at D/350 (Can. 1990).
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and more flexibly achieved in the private sphere if left to the vari-
ous specialized administrative or quasi-judicial bodies which are
mandated and equipped to deal with discrimination in specific so-
cial and economic contexts; the concomitant apprehension that a
generally applicable bill of rights would have an unduly chilling
effect on the confidence which is essential to the meaningful en-
joyment of the individual freedom a bill of rights seeks to protect;
and the heavy if not impossible burden which application of the
Charter to private conduct would impose on the courts.31
The Canadian principle that private action is immune from the
restrictions of the Charter parallels United States law. For ex-
ample, in DeShaney v. Winnebago Social Services,3 2 the United
States Supreme Court, considering the scope of the application
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
stated, "[i]ts purpose was to protect the people from the State,
not to ensure that the State protected them from each other.
The Framers were content to leave the extent of governmental
obligation on the latter area to the democratic political
process." 33
The exclusion of private activity from the reach of the Char-
ter limits the impact of the Canadian Constitution as an anti-
discrimination device significantly, since, as Canadian Profes-
sor Peter W. Hogg aptly stated, "(t)he real threat to egalitarian
civil liberties in Canada comes not from legislative and official
action, but from discrimination by private persons, such as em-
ployers, trade unions, landlords, realtors, employers,
restauranteurs and other suppliers of goods and services."34 To
meet this "real threat to egalitarian civil liberties," the Cana-
dian governments have promulgated human rights statutes
which reach private action and forbid a broad range of discrimi-
natory acts.
B. Canada's Human Rights Laws and the Prohibition of
Workplace Sexual Harassment
All Canadian jurisdictions have enacted human rights laws
prohibiting distinct discriminatory acts, including sexual dis-
31 Id.
32 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
33 Id. at 196.
34 PEmR W. HoCx. CONSTrr TIONAL LAW OF CANADA 52-3 (1992).
346 [Vol. 8:339
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crimination in employment.3 5 The federal government, Alberta,
Manitoba, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Onta-
rio, Quebec, and the Yukon Territory also specifically prohibit
employment harassment, including workplace sexual harass-
ment.36 The reason for legislation which expressly prohibits
workplace sexual harassment, however, is less important be-
cause of the 1989 Supreme Court of Canada decision, Janzen v.
Platy Enterprises Ltd.,37 which defined illegal sex discrimina-
tion to specifically include acts of workplace sexual
harassment. 38
The key federal legislation proscribing workplace discrimi-
nation is the Canadian Human Rights Act.39 This statute
makes it "a discriminatory practice, directly or indirectly, (a) to
refuse to employ or continue to employ any individual, or (b) in
the course of employment, to differentiate adversely in relation
to an employee, on a prohibited ground of discrimination."40
The prohibited grounds of discrimination under the federal
35 In the federal jurisdiction, Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. H-6
as am. R.S.C. 1985, c. 31 (1st Supp.) and R.S.C. 1985 c. 32 (2d Supp.); in Alberta,
The Individual's Rights Protection Act, R.S.C. 1980, c. I-II, as am S.A. 1985, c. 33;
in British Columbia, Human Rights Act, S.B.C. 1984 c. 22; in Manitoba, The
Human Rights Code, S.M. 1987, c. 45; in New Brunswick, Human Rights Act,
R.S.N.B. 1973, c. H-11, as am S.N.B. 1985 c.30; in Newfoundland, Human Rights
Code, S. Nfld. 1992, c. H-14; in Nova Scotia, Human Rights Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c.
214; in Ontario, Human Rights Code, S.O. 1990, c. H-19; in Prince Edward Island,
Human Rights Act, S.P.E.I. 1988, c. H-12; in Quebec, Charter of Human Rights
and Freedoms, R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-12 as am S.Q. 1978, c. 7, § 112, and S.Q. 1980, c.
11, § 34, and S.Q. 1982, c. 61; in Saskatchewan, The Saskatchewan Human Rights
Code, S.S. 1979, c. S-24.1, as am. S.S. 1989, c. 23; in the Northwest Territories,
Fair Practices Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1974, c. F2, as am. by S.N.W.T. 1981, c. 6 (3d Sess.);
in the Yukon Territory, Human Rights Act, S.Y. 1987, c.3.
36 Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6, §§ 14.1-14.2; Alberta's
Individual's Rights Protection Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. I-II, § 9, as am, SA. 1985, c. 33
and S.A. 1990, c. 23; Manitoba's Human Rights Code, S.M. 1987, c. 45, §§ 19(1)-(2)
[sexual solicitation]; New Brunswick's Human Rights Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. H-11,
§ 7.1(2), as am. S.N.B. 1985, c. 30 and S.N.B. 1987, c. 26, § 1; Newfoundland's
Human Rights Code, S. Nfld. 1992, c. H-14, §§ 12, 13(1)-(2); Nova Scotia's Human
Rights Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 214, § 5(2) as am. R.S.N.S. 1991, c. 12, § 1; Ontario's
Human Rights Code, S.O. 1990, c. H-19, §§ 7(2); Quebec's Charter of Human
Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-12, § 10(1); Yukon's Human Rights Act,
S.Y.T. 1987, c. 3, §§ 13(1)-(2).
37 59 D.L.R.4th 352, 10 C.H.R.R. D/6205 (Can. 1989).
38 See infra notes 139-163 and accompanying text.
39 R.S.C., ch. H-6 (1985), amended by R.S.C. ch. 31 (1985, 1st Supp.), R.S.C.
ch. 32 (1985, 2d Supp.).
40 Id. s. 7.
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statute include "race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion,
age, sex, marital status, disability and conviction for which a
pardon has been granted."4 1
In addition, the Canadian Labour Code supplements the
Canadian Human Rights Act as to the federal prohibition of sex
discrimination by establishing the principle that employees are
entitled "to employment free of sexual harassment."42 The la-
bour code also mandates employers to make "every reasonable
effort to ensure that no employee is subjected to sexual harass-
ment," and in line with the demand requires the issuance by the
employer of a policy statement concerning sexual harassment. 43
Canadian federal law reaches only those within the jurisdiction
of the federal government. Unlike discrimination laws in the
United States, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196444
which serves as a powerful vehicle for broad, national regula-
tion by Congress via the constitutional authority of the com-
merce clause, 45 federal legislation in Canada has a significantly
more limited span. Essentially, federal human rights legisla-
tion in Canada reaches federal governmental entities, key pri-
vate, inter-provincial operations in communications and
transportation, federally-chartered banks, and some mining op-
erations.46 The Canadian provincial and territorial laws reach
41 Id. s. 3(1).
42 R.S.C., ch. 9, s. 17 (1985).
43 Id.
44 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988)) [hereinafter Title VII]. Title VII
prohibits employer discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2002(a)(1) (1988) (stating that it is unlawful for an em-
ployer to fail or refuse to hire, discharge, or otherwise discriminate against an em-
ployee or applicant for employment with respect to the terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment on the grounds of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin).
45 U.S. CONST. art. I.
46 See Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K), Part VI, §§ 91-95 (listing powers of the
federal Parliament and provincial legislatures). A discussion of Canadian federal-
ism and the jurisprudence surrounding the constitutional distribution of authority
between the federal government and the provinces are beyond the scope of this
article. For a discussion of Canadian federalism in the labor context, see Bell Can-
ada v. Quebec (commission de la sante et de la securite du travail), 51 D.L.R.4th
161 (Can. 1988); Canadian Nat'l Ry. v. Courtois, 51 D.L.R.4th 271 (Can. 1988). See
also Regina v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd., 49 D.L.R.4th 161, 188 (Can. 1988)
(holding that the federal government may regulate the dumping of waste in pro-
vincial waters under "the natural concern doctrine of the peace, order and good
[Vol. 8:339
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those unprotected by the federal legislation within their respec-
tive jurisdictions.
Canadian human rights statutes maintain a preferential
status in judicial review.47 The laws are "of a special nature,
not quite constitutional but certainly more than ordinary."48
Each case resting upon such legislation requires a "fair, liberal
interpretation to advance the objects of the legislation."49 As
with United States civil rights laws,50 the purpose of Canadian
human rights laws is remedial. The laws seek to eradicate dis-
crimination.51 Canadian courts have an obligation requiring
them to give effect to the purpose of the legislation.5 2 This obli-
gation was made manifest by former Canadian Supreme Court
Chief Justice Dickson in Action travail des femmes v. CN.53
Justice Dickson wrote:
Human rights legislation is intended to give rise, amongst other
things, to individual rights of great importance, rights capable of
government power of the Parliament of Canada"). See generally J.R. MALLORY,
THE STRUCTURE OF CANADiAN GOVERNMENT 367-399 (1984).
47 See Winnipeg School Div. No. 1 v. Craton, 2 S.C.R. 150 (1985).
4s Re Ont. Human Rights Comm'n. v. Simpsons-Sears Ltd., 23 D.L.R.4th 321,
329 (Can. 1985). See also Action Travail Des Femmes v. Canadian Nat'l Railways
Co., 40 D.L.R.4th 193, 207-09 (Can. 1988).
49 Robichaud v. The Queen, 40 D.L.R.4th 577, 580 (Can. 1987). See also Dick-
ason v. University of Alberta, 2 S.C.R. 1103, 1121 (1992); Re Bhinder and C.N.R.,
23 D.L.R.4th 481, 500 (Can. 1985); Insurance Corp. of British Columbia v. Heer-
spink and Director, Human Rights Code, 2 S.C.R. 145, 157-58 (1982).
50 See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 994 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd Barnes v.
Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123 (D.D.C. 1974) ("(T)he courts have con-
sistently recognized that Title VII must be construed liberally to achieve its objec-
tives; as we ourselves recently noted, it 'requires an interpretation animated by
the broad humanitarian and remedial purposes underlying the federal proscrip-
tion of employment discrimination.'") (footnote omitted) (quoting Coles v. Penny,
531 F.2d 609, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
51 Robichaud, 40 D.L.R.4th at 582 ("[Human rights legislation] is not aimed
at determining fault or punishing conduct. It is remedial. Its aim is to identify
and eliminate discrimination. If this is to be done, then the remedies must be
effective, consistent with the 'almost constitutional' nature of the rights
protected.").
52 Ont. Human Rights Comm'n. v. Simpsons-Sears Ltd., 23 D.L.R.4th 321,
329 (Can. 1985). See also Re Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission and Cana-
dian Odeon Theaters Ltd., 18 D.L.R.4th 93, 108-9 (Can. 1985) ("Generally human
rights legislation has been given a broad interpretation to ensure that the stated
objects and purposes are fulfilled. A narrow restrictive interpretation which would
defeat the purpose of legislation, that is, the elimination of discrimination, should
be avoided.").
53 40 D.L.R.4th 193 (Can. 1987).
11
PACE INT'L L. REV.
enforcement, in the final analysis, in a court of law. I recognize
that in the construction of such legislation the words of the Act
must be given their plain meaning, but it is equally important
that the rights enunciated be given their full recognition and ef-
fect. We should not search for ways and means to minimize these
rights and to enfeeble their proper impact.54
III. THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES AND
CANADIAN WORKPLACE SEXUAL HARASSMENT DOCTRINE
A. Early Doctrinal Jurisprudence in the United States
United States law incorporates two theories, or types, of
sexual harassment. 55 They are commonly referred to as "quid
pro quo" and "hostile environment" sexual harassment.56 Quid
pro quo sexual harassment is "when an employer alters an em-
ployee's job conditions or withholds an economic benefit because
the employee refuses to submit to sexual demands."57 This type
of sexual harassment is usually the easier of the two types to
recognize, since the focus for inquiry in the quid pro quo case is
upon discerning whether tangible employment benefits were ef-
fected as a consequence of sexual harassment. Hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment exists where conduct of a sexual
nature, unwelcome to the employee, "has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individual's work perform-
ance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment."58 Unlike the operative review in the quid pro
quo case, the search for a hostile environment does not focus
upon whether the sexual harassment effected tangible employ-
ment benefits. Instead, the observation is upon the nature of
54 Id. at 206.
55 See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-67 (1986).
56 See, e.g., Carrero v. New York City Housing Authority, 890 F.2d 569, 577
(2d Cir. 1989).
57 Id. at 577. See also Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 908 (11th Cir.
1982) ("An employer may not require sexual consideration from an employee as a
quid pro quo for job benefits."); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 (D.C. Cir.
1977), rev'd Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123 (D.D.C. 1974).
Examples of quid pro quo sexual harassment include instances where the em-
ployer conditions an employee's promotion on the employee consenting to sexual
demands or terminates or discharges an employee for refusing demands for sexual
intercourse.
58 Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (quoting 29 C.F.R.
Sec. 1604.11(a)(3) (1985)).
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the conditions which the employee was forced to endure in the
workplace.
Quid pro quo sexual harassment was the first type of sexual
harassment to be recognized by the American courts. The rec-
ognition came about in the 1970's after initial, unsuccessful at-
tempts by plaintiffs to equate sexual harassment with illegal
sex discrimination under Title VII.59 The first reported Title
VII sexual harassment case was Come v. Bausch & Lomb.60
The federal district court determined that sexually-oriented
conduct displayed by the plaintiff's supervisor, and claimed by
the plaintiff as violative of Title VII, was simply a matter of the
"personal proclivity, peculiarity or mannerism" of the supervi-
sor. Moreover, Title VII did not make sexually-oriented conduct
that has "no relationship to the nature of the employment" ille-
gal.6 1 Other United States courts agreed, holding that Title VII
was inapplicable to sexual harassment claims. The courts in
these early cases did not perceive the sexually-oriented conduct
complained of as gender based, but instead, as simply discrimi-
nation based upon the individual characteristics of sexual at-
tractiveness of the complainant, or upon the particular
individual's refusal to engage in sexual conduct.6 2
The first case accepting the quid pro quo theory of sexual
harassment under Title VII was Williams v. Saxbe.6 3 In this
1976 federal district court case, an employee alleged that a pre-
viously good working relationship she had with her supervisor
soured after she refused her supervisor's sexual advances.6 4
The employee asserted that after she refused the advances her
supervisor exhibited a pattern of workplace harassment to-
59 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. s. 2000e
to 2000e-17 (1988)).
60 390 F.Supp. 161, 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 289 (D.Ariz. 1975). The
first federal district court sexual harassment case, although not reported until af-
ter Come was reported, is Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123
(D.D.C. 1974).
61 Come, 390 F.Supp. at 163.
62 See Tompkins v. Public Ser. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F.Supp. 553 (D.C.N.J.
1976); Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F.Supp. 233 (N.D.Cal. 1976); Barnes v.
Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123 (D.D.C. 1974).
63 413 F.Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, Williams v. Bell, 587
F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
64 Id. at 655.
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wards her. 65 The court held that the retaliatory actions taken
by the male supervisor against the female employee, who de-
clined his sexual advances, constituted an actionable Title VII
claim.66 Further, the court stated that, "[taking the facts of the
plaintiff's complaint as true, the conduct of the plaintiff's super-
visor created an artificial barrier to employment which was
placed before one gender and not the other, despite the fact that
both genders were similarly situated."6 7
After the decision in Williams, several federal circuit courts
reversed earlier district court holdings which refused to accept
the quid pro quo theory as a basis for a Title VII sexual discrim-
ination action. In Garber v. Saxen Business Products, Inc.,68 a
woman who was discharged from her employment brought a Ti-
tle VII action alleging that she was discharged for rejecting her
male supervisor's sexual advances. 69 The trial court, employing
the general approach at the time, dismissed the woman's com-
plaint for failure to state a valid Title VII claim. 70 The Fourth
Circuit reversed and remanded to the trial court for further ac-
tion in line with its finding that the plaintiff's allegations exhib-
ited "an employer policy or acquiescence in a practice of
compelling female employees to submit to the sexual advances
of their male supervisors in violation of Title VII."71
In Barnes v. Costle,72 a former employee alleged that her
job was abolished because she did not consent to having a sex-
ual affair with her male supervisor.73 The district court failed
to find a Title VII claim since the plaintiff, in the trial court's
view, "was discriminated against, not because she was a wo-
man, but because she refused to engage in a sexual affair with
65 Id. at 655-56 (the harassment included "unwarranted reprimands, refusals
to inform her of matters for the performance of her responsibilities, refusal to con-
sider her proposals and recommendations, and refusal to recognize her as a compe-
tent professional").
66 Id. at 661.
67 Id. at 657-58.
68 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977).
69 Id.
70 Garber v. Saxon Business Products, Inc., 14 Empl. Prac. Decisions (CCH)
7586 (E.D. Va. 1976), rev'd, 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977).
71 Garber, 552 F.2d at 1032.
72 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 123 (D.D.C. 1974).
73 Id. at 984.
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her supervisor."74 The D.C. Circuit disagreed, finding that the
plaintiff had been a target of the supervisor's sexual design pre-
cisely because of her gender.75 The appellate court held that a
Title VII claim could be based on the particular sexual harass-
ment allegations in the case.76
A similar result occurred in Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. &
Gas Co. 77 where the plaintiff alleged that her continued employ-
ment "was conditioned on her submitting to the sexual ad-
vances of a male supervisor."78 The Third Circuit reversed the
trial court's finding that a valid Title VII claim was lacking,
opining:
[T]itle VII is violated when a supervisor, with the actual or con-
structive knowledge of the employer, makes sexual advances or
demands toward a subordinate employee and conditions that em-
ployee's job status-evaluation, continued employment, promotion,
or other aspects of career development on a favorable response to
those advances or demands and the employer does not take
prompt and appropriate remedial action after acquiring such
knowledge. 79
Hostile environment sexual harassment was first recog-
nized in 1981 by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in
Bundy v. Jackson.80 In Bundy, an employee of the District of
Columbia municipal government complained that she had ex-
perienced frequent sexual intimidation from her supervisors.
Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that her supervisors would
continually request that she have sexual relations with them,
and one inquired of the plaintiff's sexual penchant.8 '
The district court determined that the sexual intimidation
experienced by the plaintiff was "standard operating procedure"
in her department.8 2 Nevertheless, the trial court denied the
74 Barnes v. Train, Civ. No. 1828-73 (D.D.C.), memorandum opinion at 3
(Aug. 9, 1974) (Also cited at 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123 (D.D.C. 1974)).
75 Barnes, 561 F.2d at 990 ("But for her womanhood, from aught that appears,
her participation in sexual activity would never have been solicited.").
76 Id.
77 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977). See also Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d
211 (9th Cir. 1979); Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 562 F.2d 55 (8th Cir. 1977).
78 Tomkins, 568 F.2d at 1045.
79 Id. at 1048-49.
80 641 F.2d 934 (D.C.Cir. 1981).
81 Id. at 940.
82 Id. at 939.
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plaintiff relief, reasoning that sexual harassment which did not
actually result in the loss or denial of tangible job benefits was
simply not actionable under Title VII.83 The district court
found that the plaintiff's supervisors "did not take the 'game' of
sexually propositioning female employees 'seriously', and that
... rejection of their advances did not evoke in them any motive
to take any action against the plaintiff."8 4
However, the appellate court held that Title VII sexual dis-
crimination may occur "where an employer created or condoned
a substantially discriminatory work environment regardless of
whether the complaining employees lost any tangible job bene-
fits as a result of the discrimination."8 5 The court observed that
unless such legal liability existed, the employer could harass an
employee "with impunity by carefully stopping short of firing
the employee or taking any other tangible action against her in
response to her resistance, thereby creating the impression...
that the employer did not take the ritual of harassment and
resistance 'seriously'."8 6
American courts soon followed the lead of the D. C. Circuit
Court. In 1982, the Eleventh Circuit decided Henson v. City of
Dundee8 7 and held that:
A pattern of sexual harassment inflicted upon an employee be-
cause of her sex is a pattern of behavior that inflicts disparate
treatment upon a member of one sex with respect to terms, condi-
tions or privileges of employment. There is no requirement that
an employee subjected to such disparate treatment prove in addi-
tion that she has suffered tangible job detriment.88
An additional important early case accepting the hostile en-
vironment theory of recovery under Title VII is the 1983 Fourth
Circuit case, Katz v. Dole.8 9 Katz involved a former federal air
traffic controller who alleged that she experienced substantial
workplace sexual harassment from Federal Aviation Adminis-
83 Id.
84 Bundy, 641 F.2d at 940.
85 Id. at 943-44.
86 Id. at 945.
87 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
88 Id. at 902.
89 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983).
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tration employees, including supervisory personnel. 90 The
court stated that "(w)hen such harassment pervades the work-
place, or is condoned or carried out by supervisory personnel, it
becomes an illegal and discriminatory condition of employment
that poisons the work environment."91 As a result, the court
found the conduct "actionable under Title VII."92
B. Early Doctrinal Jurisprudence in Canada
The doctrinal development of sexual harassment law in
Canada was similar to the development of the law in the United
States in that the early Canadian decisions focused upon the
same central issue, that is, whether acts of sexual harassment
in the workplace amounted to sex discrimination prohibited by
a jurisdiction's human rights law. Bell v. Ladas,93 a 1980 Onta-
rio human rights adjudication board case, was the first Cana-
dian decision to equate sexual harassment with prohibited sex
discrimination.
In Bell, the plaintiffs, Cherie Bell and Anna Korczak, fe-
male employees of The Flaming Steer Restaurant, complained
of acts of sexual harassment by Ernest Ladas, the officer and
controlling shareholder of the corporate employer. Both plain-
tiffs alleged that they had been propositioned by Ladas, and
were also forced to endure a series of his sexually-oriented ver-
bal insults. The tribunal adjudicator, Owen B. Shime, dis-
missed the plaintiffs' complaints. However, he did not dismiss
the complaints because he failed to find that sexual harassment
was equivalent to a form of prohibited sexual discrimination.
Rather, he dismissed the complaints because he determined
that Bell's testimony was unreliable, and that Korczak simply
failed to carry her burden of proof.
As to the central issue of whether sexual harassment was a
form of illegal sex discrimination, which is actionable under the
Ontario Human Rights Code's prohibition of sex discrimination,
Adjudicator Shime made the necessary equation. In obiter
dicta, Shime wrote:
90 Id. at 253.
91 Id. at 254 (emphasis added).
92 Id. at 256.
93 Re Bell and Korczak, 27 L.A.C.2d 227, 1 C.H.R.R. D/155 (Ont. Bd. of Inq.
1980), sub nom. Bell v. Ladas [hereinafter cited to C.H.R.R.].
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But what about sexual harassment? Clearly a person who is dis-
advantaged because of her sex, is being discriminated against in
her employment when employer conduct denies her financial re-
wards because of her sex, or exacts some form of sexual compli-
ance to improve or maintain her existing benefits. The evil to be
remedied is the utilizations of economic power or authority so as
to restrict a woman's guaranteed and equal access to the work-
place, and all of its benefits, free from extraneous pressures hav-
ing to do with the mere fact that she is a woman. Where a wo-
man's equal access is denied or when terms or conditions differ
when compared to male employees, the woman is discriminated
against.
The forms ofprohibited conduct that, in my view, are discrim-
inatory run the gamut from overt gender based activity, such as
coerced intercourse to unsolicited physical contact to persistent
propositions to more subtle conduct such as gender based insults
and taunting, which may reasonably be perceived to create a nega-
tive psychological and emotional work environment. 
94
The first Canadian case to actually find an employer liable
for illegal sex discrimination because of workplace sexual har-
assment was Coutroubis v. Sklavos Printing95 decided in 1981
by the Ontario Board of Inquiry. Soon, the principle that sexual
harassment amounted to prohibited sex discrimination, as first
espoused in Bell and then given force in Coutroubis, was ac-
cepted by other tribunals across Canada.96
While the development of legal doctrine in Canada and the
United States was similar in the sense that the early Canadian
decisions focused on the issue of whether acts of sexual harass-
ment amounted to prohibited sex discrimination, unlike the
94 Id. at D/156 (emphasis added).
95 2 C.H.R.R. D/457 (Ont. Bd. of Inq. 1981).
96 See Kotyk v. Canadian Employment & Immigration Comm'n., 4 C.H.R.R.
D/1416 (Can. H. R. Comm'n 1983); Phillips v. Hermiz, 5 C.H.R.R. D/2450 (Sask. H.
R. Comm'n 1984); Deisting v. Dollar Pizza Ltd., 3 C.H.R.R. D/898 (Alta. H. R.
Comm'n 1982); Hughes v. Dollar Snack Bar, 3 C.H.R.R. D/1014 (Ont. Bd. of Inq.
1981); Torres v. Royalty Kitchenware Ltd., 3 C.H.R.R. D/858 (Ont. Bd. of Inq.
1982); Doherty v. Lodger's Int'l. Ltd., 38 N.B.R.2d 217 (N.B. Bd. of Inq. 1981); Cox
v. Jagbritte Inc. (Super Great Submarine), 3 C.H.R.R. D/609 (Ont. Bd. of Inq.
1981) (reviewing the development of American sexual harassment jurisprudence);
Mitchell v. Traveller Inn Ltd., 2 C.H.R.R. D590 (Ont. Bd. of Inq. 1981). As for
early appellate court authority equating sexual harassment with illegal sex dis-
crimination, see Re Mehta and MacKinnon, 19 D.L.R.4th 148 (N.S.C.A. 1985);
Foisy v. Bell Canada, 18 D.L.R.4th 222 (Que. S.C. 1984).
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American experience, Canadian sexual harassment law did not
develop in steps. In Canada, the law did not develop by first
accepting the quid pro quo perspective and later adopting the
hostile environment type of sexual harassment.97
In Bell, Adjudicator Shime, at the outset, viewed the nature
of sexual harassment broadly. This Canadian approach was
made explicit in Cox v. Jagbritte Inc.98 In Cox, the Ontario
Board of Inquiry considered the historical development of sex-
ual harassment law in the United States. It rejected a narrow,
quid pro quo approach for dealing with sexual harassment com-
plaints, and specifically approved of the approach taken by the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in
Bundy v. Jackson.99 It equated the rationale in Bundy with
that presented in Bell, and held that sexual harassment was
not limited to situations involving the loss of tangible job bene-
fits, but also included those situations involving a hostile work
environment. 00
While the evolution of Canadian sexual harassment law
failed to proceed in lockstep with the American experience,
early Canadian tribunals did draw heavily upon American au-
thority to support their decisions. In Canadian cases, human
rights tribunals and courts commonly recognized that the legal
theory of sexual harassment owed its first clear articulation to
the American cases. 1° 1 Canadian triers of fact commonly con-
sidered the United States precedents in their deliberations, and
they frequently adopted those decisions as authority for similar
Canadian holdings. 10 2 There was an early concern about using
97 See supra notes 55-92 and accompanying text.
98 (Super Great Submarine), 3 C.H.R.R. D/609 (Ont. Bd. of Inq. 1981).
99 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (the first American case recognizing the avail-
ability of an hostile environment sexual harassment theory of recovery in Title VII
cases). See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
100 Cox, 3 C.H.R.R. at D/612-16.
101 See, e.g., Watt v. Regional Municipality of Niagara, 5 C.H.R.R. D/2453 (Ont.
Bd. of Inq. 1984).
102 See, e.g., Cox v. Jagbritte Inc. (Super Great Submarine), 3 C.H.R.R. D/609
(Ont. Bd. of Inq. 1981) (reviewing the historical development of American sexual
harassment jurisprudence); Giouvanoudis v. Golden Fleece Restaurant, 3 C.H.R.R.
D/1967 (Ont. Bd. of Inq. 1984). See also, A. AGGARWAL, SEXUAL HARASS-
MENT IN THE WORKPLACE 16 (1992) ("In the absence of Canadian jurispru-
dence on this subject, the Canadian Boards of Inquiry, Tribunals and courts have
frequently examined or referred to, and even adopted, U.S. court cases and other
authorities.").
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United States authority to support sexual harassment doctrinal
development in Canada due to a fear that such decisions would
have a U.S. constitutional basis inappropriate in Canada. 10 3
Nonetheless, the authority was liberally employed throughout
the Canadian judicial system. The Canadian tribunals came to
correctly view the American decisions as based, not on the
United States Constitution, but upon United States civil rights
statutes.10 4 An example of the typical Canadian approach to
considering American authority in adjudicating sexual harass-
ment cases is found in the 1985 Nova Scotia Court of Appeal
case, Re Mehta and MacKinnon.10 5 In Mehta, the court opined,
"[a] review of the decisions, including the American authorities,
leads me to the conclusion that sexual harassment as a term or
condition of employment is prohibited by s. 11A(1) of the Nova
Scotia Human Rights Act."10 6
The line of Canadian cases equating sexual harassment
with illegal sex discrimination, which began with Bell in 1980,
continued uninterrupted until the Manitoba Court of Appeal de-
parted from that precedent in 1986, in Janzen v. Platy Enter-
prises Ltd.'0 7 The Manitoba court's decision set the stage for
the appeal to the Canadian Supreme Court, and the Canadian
high court's landmark 1989 Janzen decision. 0 8
IV. TiHE UNITED STATES AND CANADIAN SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS IN THE VINSoN AND JAIZEN CASES
A. The United States Supreme Court's Vinson Decision
The United States Supreme Court handed down its first
sexual harassment decision in 1986, in Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson (hereinafter Vinson).10 9 The plaintiff in the case,
103 See Doherty v. Lodger's Int'l Ltd. (1981), 38 N.B.R.2d 217, 235 (N.B. Bd. of
Inq. 1981).
104 See id. Of course, the key statute is Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. s. 2000e to
2000e-17 (1988)).
105 19 D.L.R.4th 148 (N.S.C.A. 1985).
106 Id. at 158 (emphasis added).
107 33 D.L.R.4th 32, 8 C.H.R.R. D/3831 (Man.CA. 1986), rev'd 59 D.L.R.4th
352, 10 C.H.R.R. D/6205 (Can. 1989).
108 Janzen, 59 D.L.R.4th 352, 10 C.H.R.R. D/6205 (Can. 1989).
109 477 U.S. 57 (1986). The Supreme Court has decided two sexual harassment
decisions. The second is Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 114 S.Ct. 367 (1993). See
infra notes 235-49 and accompanying text.
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Michelle Vinson, was fired from her employment with the de-
fendant bank for the excessive use of sick leave. She sued alleg-
ing sexual harassment against the bank and her supervisor at
the bank, Sidney Taylor. The plaintiff testified before the trial
court that her supervisor made sexual advances toward her. In-
itially, the plaintiff refused the advances, but she eventually
agreed to engage in sexual relations with Taylor out of anxiety
over the possible loss of her job. The plaintiff testified that Tay-
lor made repeated demands on her, resulting in frequent acts of
sexual intercourse over approximately a three-year period until
1977 when the plaintiff began a steady personal relationship
with another man, and Taylor's sexual demands ceased.
The plaintiff also testified that her supervisor fondled her
in public, exposed himself, followed her into the women's rest-
room, and, on several occasions, raped her. Vinson testified
that other women employees were also fondled by Taylor. The
plaintiff neither reported the claimed sexual harassment, nor
used an existing bank grievance procedure to complain of Tay-
lor's conduct. However, she testified that her failure to employ
these procedures was due to a fear of her supervisor. The plain-
tiff's supervisor and the defendant bank denied the plaintiff's
allegations. The bank also claimed that if Taylor did engage in
acts of sexual harassment against Vinson, the sexual harass-
ment was unknown to the bank and performed without the
bank's approval.
The trial court denied Vinson relief without resolving the
conflicts in the testimony. 110 Instead, the court found that if
Vinson and her supervisor did enter into a sexual relationship,
"that relationship was a voluntary one having nothing to do
with her [Vinson's] continued employment at [the bank] or her
advancement or promotions at the institution."1 ' Therefore,
the district court concluded that, absent harassment directly af-
fecting tangible economic benefits, the plaintiff could not be a
victim of sexual discrimination under Title VII. The trial court
also noted that the bank had an express policy against employ-
ment discrimination, and no complaint was filed against Taylor
by the plaintiff. The court stated that since the bank had no
110 Vinson, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37 (D.D.C. 1980).
111 Id. at 42.
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notice of the conduct, it was not liable for the alleged actions of
Taylor.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court.1 12 The appellate court determined that a Title VII
claim for sexual harassment could be supported by either the
quid pro quo or the hostile environment theory for sexual har-
assment. The appellate court, concluding that the plaintiff's al-
legations met the requirements for the establishment of an
hostile environment type of sexual harassment, found that the
trial court's failure to consider the theory justified a reversal
and remand.
The appellate court stated that any voluntariness on Vin-
son's part in the alleged relationship with Taylor was immate-
rial, as long as the evidence otherwise established that Taylor's
actions made Vinson's toleration of the sexual harassment "a
condition of her employment." 11 3 The court surmised that the
trial court's finding of voluntariness could have been based on
evidence concerning Vinson's personal fantasies and her partic-
ular mode of dress in the workplace. The appellate court deter-
mined that such evidence had no legitimate place in the
litigation. Finally, the appellate court held that a strict liability
standard should be imposed on the employer bank for the su-
pervisor's sexual harassment. The court determined that the
employer will be held liable even absent notice of improper ac-
tivities by the supervisor. The court defined supervisor broadly
as an individual having "the mere existence or even the appear-
ance of a significant degree of influence in vital job decisions.114
In 1985, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review
the appellate court decision in Vinson."1 The case was argued
on March 25, 1986 and decided on June 19, 1986.116 In its deci-
sion, the Court put to rest any question as to the application of
Title VII in the sexual harassment context. The Court stated
that "(w)ithout question, when a supervisor sexually harasses a
subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor
112 Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
113 Id. at 146.
114 Id. at 150.
115 Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 474 U.S. 1047 (1985).
116 See Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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'discriminate(s)' on the basis of sex" under Title VII.1 17 The
Court also determined that the hostile environment type of sex-
ual harassment, as well as the quid pro quo theory of recovery,
was available as a basis for the Title VII litigation. The Court
stated, "a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by prov-
ing that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or
abusive work environment."1 18
In Vinson, the Court also discussed the nature of actionable
workplace sexual harassment in a hostile environment case.
Not all conduct that may be termed "harassment" is actionable
under Title VII. The Court stated that to be actionable the
"conduct must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the
conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive
working environment.' "119 In considering Vinson's allegations,
the Court found "not only pervasive harassment but also crimi-
nal conduct of the most serious nature." 20 The alleged conduct,
the court stated, was "plainly sufficient to state a claim of 'hos-
tile environment' sexual harassment."' 21 Therefore, the Court
did not provide an exacting analysis of the standard for deter-
mining the existence of sufficiently severe or pervasive conduct.
The Court in Vinson did state that voluntariness, "in the
sense that the complainant was not forced to participate against
her will," is not a defense to a Title VII sexual harassment
suit.' 22 Therefore, the Court found the trial court's focus on the
"voluntariness" of Vinson's relationship with Taylor was an er-
ror. Instead, the Court stated, "[t]he correct inquiry is whether
respondent by her conduct indicated that the alleged sexual ad-
vances were unwelcome, not whether her actual participation in
sexual intercourse was voluntary."123
On the other hand, the court of appeals in its decision man-
dated that evidence of Vinson's "dress and personal fantasies"
117 Id. at 64.
118 Id. at 66.
119 Id. at 67.
120 Id.
121 Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67.
122 Id. at 68.
123 Id. See Burns v. McGregor Electronic Industries, Inc., 955 F.2d 559, 565
(8th Cir. 1992) ("(T)he threshold for determining that conduct is unwelcome is 'that
the employee did not solicit or incite it, and the employee regarded the conduct as
undesirable or offensive.'") (quoting Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1014
(8th Cir. 1988)).
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be excluded at trial since the appellate court viewed voluntari-
ness as immaterial. The Supreme Court disagreed with the ap-
pellate court:
While 'voluntariness' in the sense of consent is not a defense..., it
does not follow that a complainant's sexually provocative speech
or dress is irrelevant as a matter of law in determining whether
he or she found particular sexual advances unwelcome. 124
The evidence, the Court determined, is "obviously relevant" to
the question of unwelcomeness.125 However, the Court did cau-
tion trial courts that the decision to admit such evidence should
involve a thorough consideration of the potential for unfair prej-
udice to the plaintiff.
As previously noted, the Vinson trial court found no basis
for employer liability without employer notice of the supervi-
sor's wrongful conduct. The court of appeals, however, found
employer notice unnecessary, and it imposed a strict liability
standard on the employer bank. Before the Supreme Court,
three views were argued regarding the nature and scope of em-
ployer liability. Predictably, the plaintiff urged the Court to ac-
cept the court of appeals' strict liability standard. The employer
bank argued that the failure of the plaintiff to use the grievance
procedure made available to her by the employer, or otherwise
give the employer notice of the alleged misconduct by the super-
visor, served as a complete defense to the employer. The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter the
"EEOC") appeared before the Court as amicus curiae. In argu-
ing the issue of employer liability to the Court, the EEOC de-
parted from its own guidelines 126 which called for the
imposition of strict liability on the employer in such a case, 127
and argued, instead, for a two-level liability standard. The
EEOC continued to call for a strict liability standard in the quid
124 Vinson, 477 U.S. at 69.
125 Id.
126 Final Guidelines on Sexual Harassment, 45 Fed. Reg. 74676-74677 (1980)
(codified at 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1604.11(a)-(f) (1994)).
127 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1604.11(c) (1994) (imposing a strict liability standard on em-
ployers for the acts of supervisors "regardless of whether the specific acts com-
plained of were authorized or even forbidden by the employer and regardless of
whether the employer knew or should have known of their occurrence.").
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pro quo case. However, as to the hostile environment case, they
EEOC proposed to the Court a different standard:
If the employer has an expressed policy against sexual harass-
ment and has implemented a procedure specifically designed to
resolve sexual harassment claims, and if the victim does not take
advantage of that procedure, the employer should be shielded
from liability absent actual knowledge of the sexually hostile en-
vironment (obtained, e.g., by the filing of a charge with the
E.E.O.C. or a comparable state agency). In all other cases, the
employer will be liable if it has actual knowledge of the harass-
ment or if, considering all of the facts of the case, the victim in
question had no reasonably available avenue for making his or
her complaint known to appropriate management officials.
128
The Court responded frankly to the various invitations of-
fered by the participants. It indicated that the debate over the
appropriate standard of employer liability had "a rather ab-
stract quality about it given the state of the record" in the
case. 129 The operative point was that the district court failed to
resolve the conflicts in testimony at the trial level. Therefore,
the Court held:
We do not know at this stage whether Taylor made any sexual
advances toward respondent at all, let alone whether those ad-
vances were unwelcome, whether they were sufficiently pervasive
to constitute a condition of employment, or whether they were 'so
pervasive and so long continuing... that the employer must have
become conscious of [them]." 30
The Court declined "the parties' invitation to issue a definitive
rule on employer liability,"13 but it did offer some assistance.
It stated that Congress intended courts to look to the prin-
ciples of agency law for guidance and wanted to place some lim-
its on Title VII employer liability for acts of employees. The
Court held that the appellate court was wrong in its decision
concluding that employers are "always automatically liable for
128 Vinson, 477 U.S. at 71 (quoting Brief for United States and EEOC as Amici
Curiae 26).
129 Vinson, 477 U.S. at 72.
130 Id. (quoting Taylor v. Jones, 653 F.2d 1193, 1197-99 (8th Cir. 1981) (hold-
ing the employer liable for racially hostile working environment based on the em-
ployer's constructive knowledge)).
131 Id.
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sexual harassment by their supervisors."13 2 Thus, the Court re-
jected the strict liability standard in a hostile environment case.
On the other hand, by refusing to accept the application of blan-
ket rules as to employer liability, the Court also held that an
employer's absence of notice "does not necessarily insulate that
employer from liability."133 The rather bleary commentary was
clarified to some extent through a discussion by the Court of the
value of an existing employer policy against discrimination and
an available employer grievance procedure. The Court rejected
the employer bank's position that "the mere existence of a griev-
ance procedure and a policy against discrimination, coupled
with respondent's failure to invoke that procedure, must insu-
late petitioner [the bank] from liability."134 The facts were seen
as relevant by the Court, but it also found that the facts were
not "necessarily dispositive" as to the issue of employer
liability.135
The Court determined that the bank's anti-discrimination
policy in Vinson was simply too general. The policy failed to
specifically address sexual harassment, and as a result, the pol-
icy failed to "alert employees to their employer's interest in cor-
recting that form of discrimination." 3 6 Also, the Court found
the bank's grievance procedure flawed. The Court found that
the bank's position that the plaintiff's failure to utilize the pro-
cedure should be an employer defense "might be substantially
stronger if its procedure was better calculated to encourage vic-
tims of harassment to come forward." 37 The grievance proce-
dure initially required an employee to file a complaint with her
supervisor, and in the plaintiff's case it was Taylor, the alleged
harasser. The Court stated that "it is not altogether surprising
that respondent (Vinson) failed to invoke the procedure and re-
port her grievance" to Taylor.138
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Vinson, 477 U.S. at 72.
136 Id. at 72-73.
137 Id. at 73.
138 Id.
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B. The Canadian Supreme Court's Janzen Decision
The plaintiffs in Janzen v. Platy Enterprises Ltd.,139 Di-
anna Janzen and Tracy Govereau, worked as waitresses at the
Pharos Restaurant, owned and operated by Platy Enterprises
Ltd. in Winnipeg, Manitoba. Both individuals complained of
pervasive sexual harassment on the part of the restaurant's
cook, Tommy Grammas (hereinafter the "cook"). The conduct
plaintiffs complained of included sexual advances and sexually-
oriented physical contact. The cook did not hold an ownership
interest in the restaurant, did not serve as a corporate officer,
and had no actual disciplinary authority over the waitresses.
However, he did represent to the waitresses that he had the au-
thority to fire them, and the representation was apparently sup-
ported by the employer corporation's president and manager,
Eleftheros, a\k\a Phillip Anastasiadis (hereinafter
Anastasiadis).
Both waitresses complained of the cook's conduct to Anas-
tasiadis, however, his response was unhelpful. As to Janzen,
Anastasiadis treated the matter lightly and even insinuated
that Janzen was at fault for the cook's behavior. He failed to
halt the cook's misconduct, and as a result, Janzen quit. Anas-
tasiadis asked Govereau why she let the cook treat her the way
he did. After Govereau met with Anastasiadis, the cook's
overtly sexual behavior toward Govereau stopped. However,
that conduct was replaced with open hostility exhibited by both
Anastasiadis and the cook toward Govereau. Govereau was
eventually terminated by Anastasiadis, allegedly, because of
her poor work.
Janzen and Govereau filed complaints with the Manitoba
Human Rights Commission alleging sex discrimination in viola-
tion of section 6 of the Manitoba Human Rights Act. 140 The
complaints were heard jointly by a human rights adjudication
board, where the Adjudicator found that both individuals were
victims of illegal sexual harassment. The Adjudicator applied
139 59 D.L.R.4th 352, 10 C.H.R.R. D/6205 (Can. 1989) (hereinafter cited to
C.H.R.R.).
140 S.M., c. 65, s. 6(1) (1974). In 1987, after the filing of the complaints by the
waitresses, the Human Rights Act was repealed and replaced with the Manitoba
Human Rights Code, S.M., ch. 45 (1987-88). Section 19 of the code expressly pro-
hibits sexual harassment. S.M., ch. 45, ss. 19(1)-(2) (1987).
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the equation first established in Bell, concluding that the sexual
harassment amounted to illegal sex discrimination under the
Manitoba Human Rights Act. The Adjudicator found the em-
ployer, as well as the cook, liable, and noted that:
[t]he clear intent of Sec. 6(10), in respect of discrimination arising
therefrom, is not only to make the employer liable for any acts of
sexual harassment directly committed by such employer, but also
makes him responsible for any such acts committed by a person in
authority during the course of his employment. 141
The Adjudicator also said:
[aifter consideration of all of the evidence, it is my conclusion that
Tommy (the cook) was a person in such authority that his acts
became those of the employer,.... The complainant Janzen was
made aware of this to the extent that Tommy was in such a pre-
ferred position, that if she subjected herself to sexual harassment,
she was to blame for it. Accordingly such harassment had become
a condition of her continued employment since Phillip (Anastasia-
dis) either couldn't or wouldn't do anything about it.14 2
The employer appealed to the Manitoba Court of Queen's
Bench, but this court upheld the Adjudicator's decision. 143
Thereafter, an appeal was taken to the Manitoba Court of Ap-
peal, where Justices Huband and Twaddle each set out compre-
hensive separate opinions for the appellate court.'44
Justice Huband expressed his amazement that sexual har-
assment had been equated with sex discrimination in other Ca-
nadian decisions since he viewed sexual harassment and sex
discrimination as separate concepts. He used an analogy to ex-
plain his position, "[w]hen a schoolboy steals a kiss from a fe-
male classmate, one might well say that he is harassing her;
vexing her; harrying her; - but he surely is not discriminating
against her."145 Justice Huband also analyzed Sec. 6(1) of the
Manitoba Human Rights Act, concluding that the law only for-
bids discrimination in a purely generic sense. Justice Huband's
view was that a prohibition in the generic sense mandates that
141 Janzen, 6 C.H.R.R. D/2735, D/2753 (Man. Bd. Adjud. 1985).
142 Id. at D/2768.
143 See 7 C.H.R.R. D/3309 (Man. Q.B. 1986).
I4 Janzen, 33 D.L.R.4th 32, 8 C.H.R.R. D/3831 (Man.C.A. 1986), rev'd 59
D.L.R.4th 352, 10 C.H.R.R. D/6205 (Can. 1989) (hereinafter cited to C.H.R.R.).
145 Id. at D/3834.
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the discrimination is against women as a group. Sexual harass-
ment, he determined, could not logically be sex discrimination
since all women are not the victims of sexual harassment.
Justice Twaddle agreed that sexual harassment could not
be a form of actionable sex discrimination. He beleived that the
legislative intent was to prohibit differentiation on the basis of
categorical groupings, particularly, the category of women, not
to prevent differentiation on the basis of personal characteris-
tics. He wrote that:
Harassment is as different from discrimination as assault is
from random selection. The victim of assault may be chosen at
random just as the victim of harassment may be chosen because
of categorical distinction, but it is nonsense to say that assault is
random selection just as it is nonsense to say that harassment is
discrimination. The introduction of a sexual element, be it the
nature of the conduct or the gender of the victim, does not alter
the basic fact that harassment and assault are acts, whilst dis-
crimination and random selection are the methods of choice.
The fact that harassment is sexual in form does not deter-
mine the reason why the victim was chosen. Only if the woman
was chosen on a categorical basis, without regard to individual
characteristics, can the harassment be a manifestation of
discrimination. 146
Similar to Justice Huband, Justice Twaddle concluded that sex-
ual harassment based upon a woman's personal sexual appeal
could not constitute illegal sex discrimination. He wrote that,
"[wihere the conduct of an employer is directed at some but not
all persons of one category, it must not be assumed that mem-
bership of the category is the reason for the distinction having
been made."147
The decision of the Manitoba appellate court generated un-
favorable scholarly comment. 148 The case was then appealed to
the Supreme Court of Canada, which accepted review. The
Court proceeded to consider two central issues. First, whether
sexual harassment represents a form of illegal sex discrimina-
146 Id. at D/3845.
147 Id. at D/3846.
148 See, e.g., Ivankovich, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace-Two Steps Back-
ward: Janzen & Govereau v. Platy Enterprises Ltd., 24 ALBERTA LAW REV. 359
(1987); Burka, Sexual Harassment: Manitoba's Step Backward A Case Comment
on Govereau and Janzen v. Platy Enterprises Ltd., 16 MANITOBA L. J. 245 (1987).
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tion, and if so, whether an employer may be held liable for sex-
ual harassment through its employees' workplace acts.
The Supreme Court distinguished the Manitoba appellate
court determination from other Canadian cases, noting that
none of the other cases considering the issue since Bell had
failed to equate sexual harassment with sex discrimination.
The Court also noted that United States law equated sexual
harassment with sex discrimination. The Canadian high court
stated that "(t)he Manitoba Court of Appeal departed radically
from this apparently unbroken line of judicial opinion."149
The Court considered the meaning of the terms "sex dis-
crimination" and "sexual harassment." The Court defined sex
discrimination as "practices or attitudes which have the effect of
limiting the conditions of employment of, or the employment op-
portunities available to, employees on the basis of a characteris-
tic related to gender."150 As to the definition of sexual
harassment, itself, the Court admitted that many definitions
have been advanced. Common among the various definitions,
though, "is the concept of using a position of power to import
sexual requirements into the workplace thereby negatively al-
tering the working conditions of employees who are forced to
contend with sexual demands."1 51 After reviewing a number of
the definitions of sexual harassment found in the law, the Court
held that:
Emerging from these various legislative proscriptions is the
notion that sexual harassment may take a variety of forms. Sex-
ual harassment is not limited to demands for sexual favours made
under threats of adverse job consequences should the employee
refuse to comply with the demands. Victims of harassment need
not demonstrate that they were not hired, were denied a promo-
tion or were dismissed from their employment as a result of their
refusal to participate in sexual activity. This form of harassment,
in which the victim suffers concrete economic loss for failing to
submit to sexual demands, is simply one manifestation of sexual
harassment, albeit a particularly blatant and ugly one. Sexual
harassment also encompasses situations in which sexual demands
are foisted upon unwilling employees or in which employees must
149 Janzen, 10 C.H.R.R. at D/6223 (Can. 1989) (emphasis added).
150 Id. at D/6224.
151 Id. at D/6225.
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endure sexual groping, propositions, and inappropriate comments,
but where no tangible economic rewards are attached to involve-
ment in the behaviour.152
The Court acknowledged the common practice in the
United States of formally categorizing sexual harassment in the
contexts of either "quid pro quo" or "hostile environment" sexual
harassment:
The American courts have tended to divide sexual harass-
ment into two categories: the 'quid pro quo' variety in which tangi-
ble employment-related benefits are made contingent upon
participation in sexual activity, and conduct which creates a 'hos-
tile environment' by requiring employees to endure sexual ges-
tures and posturing in the workplace. Both forms of sexual
harassment have been recognized by the American courts includ-
ing the United States Supreme Court .... 153
The Canadian Court also acknowledged that the common prac-
tice in the Canadian human rights tribunals was to also "rely on
the quid pro quo/hostile environment work environment dichot-
omy." 154 Nevertheless, while the Canadian courts have often
followed the approach of American courts in the development of
sexual harassment law doctrine, in this instance, the Canadian
Supreme Court specifically found the American categorization
of the two types of sexual harassment unhelpful:
While the distinction may have been important to illustrate force-
fully the range of behaviour that constitutes harassment at a time
before sexual harassment was widely viewed as actionable, ...
there is no longer any need to characterize harassment as one of
these forms. The main point in allegations of sexual harassment
is that unwelcome sexual conduct has invaded the workplace, ir-
respective of whether the consequences of the harassment in-
cluded a denial of concrete employment rewards for refusing to
participate in sexual activity.155
The Court, perhaps concluding that an exhaustive definition of
sexual harassment was impossible, and, certainly, in the partic-
ular case, simply unnecessary, avoided an attempt to do so. In-
152 Id. at D/6226 (emphasis added).
153 Id. at D/6226 (citations omitted).
154 Id.
155 Janzen, 10 C.H.R.R. at D/6226 (Can. 1989).
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stead, the Court took a liberal approach, defining broadly
sexual harassment to include "unwelcome conduct of a sexual
nature that detrimentally affects the work environment or leads
to adverse job-related consequences for the victims of the
harassment."156
The Court considered the particular rationale used by the
Manitoba Court of Appeal in its decision. The Manitoba court
viewed sexual harassment as flowing from the individual char-
acteristics of the particular victim to whom the harasser was
attracted, not from the gender of the victim. Since the Mani-
toba court interpreted the relevant anti-discrimination legisla-
tion as being designed to eradicate solely generic or categorical
discrimination, the statute, the Manitoba court concluded, could
not be applicable to prohibit sexual harassment.157 The
Supreme Court bluntly rejected the appellate court's reasoning:
To argue that the sole factor underlying the discriminatory action
was the sexual attractiveness of the appellants and to say that
their gender was irrelevant strains credulity. Sexual attractive-
ness cannot be separated from gender. The similar gender of both
appellants is not a mere coincidence, it is fundamental to under-
standing what they experienced. All female employees were po-
tentially subject to sexual harassment by the respondent ....
That his discriminatory behaviour was pinpointed against two of
the female employees would have been small comfort to other wo-
men contemplating entering such a workplace. Any female con-
sidering employment... was a potential victim of Grammas and
as such was disadvantaged because of her sex. A potential female
employee would recognize that if she were a male employee she
would not have to run the same risks of sexual harassment.... It
is one of the purpose of anti-discrimination legislation to remove
such denials of equal opportunity. 158
156 Id. at D/6227. The Court elaborated:
When sexual harassment occurs in the workplace, it is an abuse of both
economic and sexual power. Sexual harassment is a demeaning practice,
one that constitutes a profound affront to the dignity of the employees
forced to endure it. By requiring an employee to contend with unwelcome
sexual actions or explicit sexual demands, sexual harassment in the work-
place attacks the dignity and self-respect of the victim both as an em-
ployee and as a human being.
Id. (emphasis added).
157 See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
158 Janzen, 10 C.H.R.R. at D/6232.
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The Supreme Court, finding that sexual harassment did equate
with actionable sexual discrimination, quoted the American
Bundy v. Jackson decision to support its position, "sex discrimi-
nation within the meaning of title VII is not limited to disparate
treatment founded solely or categorically on gender. Rather,
discrimination is sex discrimination whenever sex is for no le-
gitimate reason a substantial factor in the discrimination." 159
The Canadian Supreme Court dealt in Janzen in less detail
with the issue of the scope of employer liability for acts of work-
place sexual harassment, since the Court had considered the is-
sue of employer liability two years earlier in Robichaud v.
Canada (Treasury Board).160 In Robichaud, the Court consid-
ered the liability of an employer under the federal Canadian
Human Rights Act. That decision, which was handed down sub-
sequent to the Manitoba Court of Appeal decision in Janzen,
found that the federal law required employers to be liable for
work-related acts. The Court did not base the employer's liabil-
ity directly on the traditional doctrine of vicarious liability. In-
stead, the basis for liability was established within the
language of the human rights statute, itself:
Hence,... the statute contemplates the imposition of liability on
employers for all acts of their employees 'in the course of employ-
ment,' interpreted in the purposive fashion outlined earlier as be-
ing in some way related or associated with the employment. It is
unnecessary to attach any label to this type of liability; it is purely
statutory. However, it serves a purpose somewhat similar to that
of vicarious liability in tort, by placing responsibility for an organ-
ization on those who control it and are in a position to take effec-
tive remedial action to remove undesirable conditions.16 1
The Manitoba statute applicable in Janzen employed the
words "in respect of employment," but the Court in Janzen saw
no real significance in the difference between that specific lan-
guage and the relevant operating language in the Canadian
Human Rights Act (which employed the words "in the course of
employment"). Since the conduct of the cook in Janzen was
viewed by the Court as clearly work-related, and employers are
159 Id at D/6233 (quoting Bundy, 641 F.2d at 942).
160 40 D.L.R.4th 577, 580, 8 C.H.R.R. D/4326 (Can. 1987) (hereinafter cited to
C.H.R.R.).
161 Id. at D/4333.
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liable for actions of their employees which are work-related, the
employer in Janzen was found liable. 162
V. DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT CONCERNING THE NATURE OF
ACTIONABLE SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE POST VINsoN
AND JkAZEN Periods
A. Doctrinal Development in the United States
The Supreme Court in the Vinson case stated that not all
conduct that in some way may be called "harassment" is action-
able under Title VII. To be actionable, the Court explained, the
"conduct must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the
conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive
working environment.' "163 However, the Court determined
that the plaintiff's specific allegations in Vinson established
"not only pervasive harassment but also criminal conduct of the
most serious nature,"16 4 and those activities were "plainly
sufficient to state a claim of 'hostile environment' sexual
harassment."'165
Therefore, the Court failed to provide a description of the
elements necessary to establish the existence of the requisite
sufficiently severe or pervasive conduct. Post-Vinson lower
courts, therefore, were left to develop their own approaches to
determine the "sufficiently severe or pervasive" threshold. Un-
fortunately, as the Kansas trial court stated in Campbell v.
Kansas State University,166 "(t)he [post-Vinson] courts have not
been entirely consistent in determining the threshold of perva-
sive or severe conduct necessary to maintain a hostile environ-
ment claim." 167.
The existence of the particular inconsistency noted in
Campbell does not mean that the post-Vinson lower courts were
inconsistent in all respects as to issues central to the determi-
nation of actionable workplace sexual harassment. Post-Vinson
lower courts commonly agreed that "the required showing of se-
162 Janzen, 10 C.H.R.R. at 6234 ("(T)he respondent Platy Enterprises must be
held liable for the actions of the cook Grammas.").
163 Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
164 Id. at 67.
165 Id.
166 780 F.Supp. 755 (D.Kan. 1991).
167 Id. at 761.
[Vol. 8:339
34http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol8/iss2/3
1996] SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW IN CANADA & U.S. 373
verity or seriousness of the harassing conduct varies inversely
with the pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct."168 There-
fore, lower courts in the post-Vinson period accepted the princi-
ple that continuous and concerted harassing conduct need not
be particularly severe or extreme to be actionable under Title
VII as an illegal hostile environment, while singular or limited
acts of extremely severe conduct may be actionable. As a result,
post-Vinson courts commonly agree that "a showing of perva-
siveness lessens the required showing of severity, and con-
versely, a showing of severity lessens the required showing of
pervasiveness. " 16 9 However, as a practical matter, although a
single, extreme act can conceivably be sufficient to impose lia-
bility,170 "generally, repeated incidents create a stronger claim
of hostile environment, with the strength of the claim depend-
ing on the number of incidents and the intensity of each
incident."'171
Post-Vinson lower courts also have commonly considered
the existence of both overtly sexual and non-sexual harassment
in determining the existence of an hostile environment. For ex-
ample, in Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co. ,172 the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals concluded that evidence of physical threats and vio-
lence against the plaintiff may be considered in determining the
existence of sufficient severity. 173 Also, the court in Hicks
stated that evidence of sexual harassment against other em-
ployees is admissible to demonstrate the existence of an hostile
168 Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991). See also Andrews v.
City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1484 (3d Cir. 1990); Carrero v. New York City
Housing Authority, 890 F.2d 569, 578 (2d Cir. 1989).
169 Trotta v. Mobil Oil Corp., 788 F.Supp. 1336, 1349 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
170 See Campbell v. Kansas State University, 780 F.Supp. 755, 762 (D.Kan.
1991) (".. .a single isolated incident-while perhaps not pervasive-may nevertheless
be so severe as to amount to an actionable violation of Title VII.").
171 King v. Bd. of Regents of U. of Wisconsin System, 898 F.2d 533, 537 (7th
Cir. 1990). See also Babcock v. Frank, 783 F.Supp 800, 808 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
172 833 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1987).
173 Id. See also Gross v. Burggraf Const. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1537 (10th Cir.
1995); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990); Lipsett v.
University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 905 (1st Cir. 1988); Hall v. Gus Const. Co.,
Inc., 842 F.2d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that the offensive conduct need
not necessarily have "explicit sexual overtones"); McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129,
1138-39 (D.C.Cir. 1985); Smolsky v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 780 F.Supp. 283,294
(E.D.Pa. 1991) ("A consideration of the sexual and non-sexual must be made to
determine if the hostile environment was created.").
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environment, and that where racial discrimination is also
raised in a case, the trier of fact may aggregate the evidence of
the racial and sexual enmity in establishing the presence of an
actionable hostile environment. 174
In Andrews v. City of Philadelphia,175 the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals effectively articulated the overall perspective
via use of a theatrical analogy, "[a] play cannot be understood
on the basis of some of its scenes but only on its entire perform-
ance, and similarly, a discrimination analysis must concentrate
not on individual incidents, but on the overall scenario. " 176 The
Andrews court opined, "It]o constitute impermissible discrimi-
nation the offensive conduct is not necessarily required to in-
clude sexual overtones in every instance or that each incident
be sufficiently severe to detrimentally affect a female em-
ployee." 177 In the particular sexual harassment action, the
plaintiffs, female police officers, presented evidence with some
overtly sexual overtones. However, most of the evidence the
plaintiffs submitted lacked these characteristics. Instead, the
plaintiffs offered evidence involving the "recurrent disappear-
ance of plaintiffs' case files and work product, anonymous phone
calls, and destruction of other property" of the plaintiffs.1 78 The
evidence submitted established a working environment in
which the plaintiffs faced a predominantly male police force, in-
cluding a large number of male officers who were sexist and also
actively antagonistic toward women in the workplace. While
much of the conduct underlying the sexual harassment claim
was not, in essence, overtly sexual, it was directed toward the
plaintiffs because they were women. The court stated that the
trial judge "should look to all of the incidents to see if they pro-
duce a work environment hostile and offensive to women of rea-
sonable sensibilities."179
174 833 F.2d at 1416. See also Broderick v. Ruder, 46 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1272 (D.D.C. 1988) (the court considered acts directed to employees other
than the plaintiff, alone, in finding the existence of a hostile environment).
175 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990).
176 Id. at 1484.
177 Id. at 1485. The court also stated: "Pervasive use of derogatory and insult-
ing terms relating to women generally and addressed to female employees person-
ally may serve as evidence of a hostile environment." Id.
178 Id. at 1486.
179 Id.
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Nonetheless, the central issue remains as to what is the ap-
propriate basis for the determination of the pervasive or severe
conduct necessary to maintain an hostile environment claim.
Post-Vinson courts have been inconsistent as to this founda-
tional issue. Courts have differed as to the proper level of atten-
tion to give to the issue of the extent of the alteration of the
conditions of the plaintiff's employment and to the related ques-
tion of the victim's psychological well-being. 180
In the initial years after the Vinson decision, the courts
tended to approach the Supreme Court's requirement of suffi-
cient severity and pervasiveness strictly. A good example of
this approach is found in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals'
1986 decision, Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.1 81 In Scott, the
plaintiff, Maxine Scott, was employed by Sears, Roebuck & Co
("Sears") as an automobile mechanic trainee.'8 2 A senior
mechanic named Gadberry was assigned to train Scott as to
"the techniques for fixing automobile brakes." 83 Scott com-
plained that Gadberry would "repeatedly" engage in acts of sex-
ual harassment against her, creating an hostile environment.18 4
Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that Gadberry had "repeatedly
propositioned her, would wink at her and also suggested he give
her a rubdown." 85 The plaintiff also alleged that Gadberry
would respond to requests for assistance by saying, "What will I
get for it?"186 She further alleged that another Sears employee
"slapped her on the buttocks and that (a third) mechanic . . .
once told her he knew she must moan and groan while having
sex."18 7 The Seventh Circuit stated that the "threshold issue
... is whether the instances of harassment alleged by the plain-
tiff rise to a level of 'hostility' offensive enough to be considered
actionable." 88 The court proceeded, "[hience, the question be-
comes did the demeaning conduct and sexual stereotyping
cause such anxiety and debilitation to the plaintiff that working
180 See infra notes 181-234 and accompanying text.
181 798 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986).
182 Id. at 211.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Scott, 798 F.2d at 211.
187 Id. at 211-12.
188 Id. at 213.
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conditions were 'poisoned' within the meaning of Title VII?" i 8 9
The court concluded that the conduct did not reach the neces-
sary level of severity to be actionable, as the court found insuffi-
cient, concrete examples of the plaintiff being offensively
propositioned.' 90 The court determined that Gadberry's winks
and suggestions of a "rub-down" were not "so pervasive or psy-
chologically debilitating that they affected Scott's ability to per-
form on the job," and that the acts of the other mechanics were
"too isolated and lacking the repetitive and debilitating effect
necessary to maintain a hostile environment claim."' 9i
A similar determination was reached by the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co.,192 where
the plaintiff, Vivienne Rabidue, asserted charges of sexual har-
assment "primarily as a result of her unfortunate acrimonious
working relationship with Douglas Henry." 93  Henry,
Rabidue's co-employee (who maintained no supervisory author-
ity over the plaintiff), was described by the court as "an ex-
tremely vulgar and crude individual who customarily made
obscene comments about women generally, and, on occasion, di-
rected such obscenities to the plaintiff."194 The obscenities were
extremely vile.' 95 The plaintiff and other women employees at
the workplace, as well, "were annoyed by Henry's vulgarity." 9
6
The plaintiff and Henry, "on the occasions when their duties ex-
posed them to each other, were constantly in a confrontation
position." 97 In addition to Henry's vulgarity and obscenities,
the plaintiff and other women employees were exposed to "pic-
tures of nude or scantily clad women" displayed at the work-
place by male employees. 198 The court stated that the plaintiff
must show that "the charged sexual harassment had the effect
of unreasonably interfering with the plaintiff's work perform-
ance and creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
189 Id. (citing Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 944 (D.C.Cir. 1981)).
190 Id. at 214.
191 Id. at 214 (emphasis added).
192 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
193 Id. at 615.
194 Id.
195 See id. at 624 (Keith, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) for infor-
mation as to the specific obscenities used.
196 Id. at 615.
197 Id.
198 Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 615.
[Vol. 8:339
38http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol8/iss2/3
1996] SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW IN CANADA & U.S. 377
environment that affected seriously the psycho logical (sic) well-
being of the plaintiff."199 The plaintiff, the court found, did not
meet this standard. The court determined that Henry's obscen-
ities "were not so startling as to have affected seriously the
psyches of the plaintiff or other female employees." 200 The court
further stated that the vulgarity of one employee did not "sub-
stantially" affect "the totality of the workplace," and the male
employees sexually-oriented posters were deminimis as to their
effect on the work environment, "when considered in the context
of a society that condones and publicly features and commer-
cially exploits open displays of written and pictorial erotica at
the newsstands, on prime-time television, at the cinema, and in
other public places." 20 1 As a result, the court did not find the
conduct complained of sufficiently severe or pervasive to result
in a working environment that could be considered intimidat-
ing, hostile, or offensive, and, therefore, illegal.
The Rabidue court drew a distinction as to the question of
the presence of liability in the instant case and in other cases,
where conduct actually included "sexual propositions, offensive
touchings, or sexual conduct of a similar nature that was sys-
tematically directed to the plaintiff over a protracted period of
time."20 2 "The precedential cases addressing a sexually hostile
and abusive environment," the court opined, "have all developed
more compelling circumstances" than presented in the instant
case.20 3 The Rabidue court imposed objective and subjective
tests for assessing the existence of an hostile environment.
Under the objective standard, plaintiff was required to establish
that the conduct interfered with a reasonable person's work per-
formance and affected "seriously the psychological well-being of
that reasonable person under like circumstances." 20 4 This, the
court stated, must be demonstrated "regardless of whether the
particular plaintiff was actually offended by the defendant's
conduct."20 5 Under the subjective standard, plaintiff would
have the additional requirement of demonstrating that "she
199 Id. at 619.
200 Id. at 622.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 622 n.7.
203 Id.
204 Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620 (emphasis added).
205 Id.
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was actually offended by the defendant's conduct and that she
suffered some degree of injury as a result of the abusive and
hostile work environment."20 6 The objective test is designed to
prevent someone of more than "average" sensitivity from recov-
ering. 20 7 The Rabidue approach mandated the trial court to
consider a broad range of specific factors, including:
[T]he nature of the alleged harassment, the background and expe-
rience of the plaintiff, her coworkers, and supervisors, the totality
of the physical environment of the plaintiff's work area, the lexi-
con of obscenity that pervaded the environment of the workplace
both before and after the plaintiff's introduction into its environs,
coupled with the reasonable expectation of the plaintiff upon vol-
untarily entering that environment.208
The Rabidue approach was followed in several post-Vinson
decisions.20 9 In one of those decisions, Lipsett v. Rive-Mora,210
the federal district court summarized the authority supporting
the restrictive approach epitomized by Rabidue. The trial court
in Lipsett stated that for an actionable Title VII claim to exist
"courts have consistently held that the harassment must reach
a certain level of severity which affects the employee's psycho-
logical well-being."211 Additionally, the trial court stated that
Title VII can not offer an actionable claim:
for each and every crude joke or sexually explicit remark made on
the job, Downes v. F.AA, 775 F.2d 288, 293 (Fed.Cir. 1985); nor
for 'every sexual innuendo or flirtation,' Ferguson v. E.I duPont de
206 Id.
207 See Lipsett v. Rive-Mora, 669 F.Supp. 1188, 1199 (D.Puerto Rico 1987),
rev'd, Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988) (Title VII is
not available "to vindicate the 'petty slights of the hypersensitive.' ").
208 Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620. See also Gross v. Burggraf Const. Co., 53 F.3d
1531, 1538 (10th Cir. 1995)("Speech that might be offensive or unacceptable in a
prep school faculty meeting, or on the floor of Congress, is tolerated in other work
environments," agreeing specifically with the operative comment in Rabidue).
209 See Weiss v. Coca-cola Bottling Co., 990 F.2d 333 (7th cir. 1993); Brooms v.
Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1989); Highlander v. KF.C. Nat. Manage-
ment Co., 805 F.2d 644 (6th Cir. 1986); Trotta v. Mobil Oil Corp., 788 F.Supp. 1336
(S.D.N.Y. 1992); Lipsett v. Rive-Mora, 669 F.Supp. 1188 (D.Puerto Rico 1987),
rev'd, Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988); Hollis v.
Fleetguard, Inc., 668 F.Supp. 631 (M.D.Tenn. 1987); Pease v. Alford Photo Indus-
tries, Inc., 667 F.Supp. 1188 (W.D.Tenn. 1987).
210 Lipsett v. Rive-Mora, 669 F.Supp. 1188 (D.Puerto Rico 1987), rev'd, Lipsett
v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988).
211 Lipsett, 669 F.Supp. at 1199.
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Nemours and Co., Inc., 560 F.Supp. 1172, 97-98 (D.Del. 1983); nor
for 'trivial or merely annoying vulgarity', Rabidue v. Osceola Re-
fining Co., 584 F.Supp. 419,433 (D.Mich. 1984) aff'd., 805 F.2d 611
(6th Cir. 1986); nor isolated incidents and occasional use of offen-
sive language as part of casual conversation in the workplace,
Volk v. Coler, 638 F.Supp. 1555, 1558-59 (C.D.Ill. 1986).212
The trial court opined that a Title VII action is unavailable "to
vindicate the 'petty slights of the hypersensitive.'" 2 13 According
to the Lipsett district court, the majority of cases finding action-
able environmental sexual harassment "have involved situa-
tions of marked hostility and abuse of a clearly exploitative or
humiliating nature because of the victim's membership in a pro-
tected group."2 14 In addition to persistent sexual demands, sex-
ual intercourse, criminal battery and rape as alleged in
Vinson,215 the trial court named some other examples. They
were, "physical contact, threats, demeaning pranks and com-
ments on plaintiff's chest size, about her sex life, graphic de-
scription of male employees' sex life" in the presence of the
plaintiff, showing the plaintiff pornographic books, and request-
ing that she participate in a sexually explicit home video;216
near daily exposure to the most vile sexual terms over a several
month period;217 and male hazing of female workers, including
"graffiti and cartoons making blatant sexual mockeries of plain-
tiffs, placing of prophylactic devises and wet vibrators in one of
plaintiff's beds, stealing their work instruments, breaking their
equipment, exclusion from meals and touching of buttocks,
breasts, waist and hair on various occasions."218
212 Id.
213 Id. (citing Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 589 F.Supp. 780, 784 (D.Wis.1984)).
214 Id.
215 See supra text accompanying note 120. See also Moylan v. Maries Country,
792 F.2d 746 (8th Cir. 1986) (alleged rape).
216 Lipsett, 669 F.Supp. at 1199 (citing Egger v. Local 276, Plumbers & Pipefit-
ters Union, 644 F.Supp. 795 (D.Mass. 1980).
217 Id. (citing Moffett v. Gene B. Glick Co., Inc., 621 F.Supp. 244 (N.D.Ind.
1985)).
218 Id. (citing Bechman v. City of New York, 580 F.Supp. 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1983)).
While the trial court's decision in Lipsett provides a useful summary of authority
supporting a strict approach to determining sufficient severity or pervasiveness, on
appeal, a panel of the First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's deci-
sion. Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988). The appel-
late court found evidence of sufficient severity. Id. at 905. The appellate decision
conformed to a liberal approach toward finding sufficient severity and pervasive-
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The lead decision opposing the restrictive approach exem-
plified in Scott and Rabidue is Ellison v. Brady.2 19 The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals' decision focused upon the victim's per-
spective. This developed, as a result, a doctrinal approach for
determining actionable workplace sexual harassment which
was considerably more favorable to plaintiffs. In this case, the
plaintiff, Kerry Ellison, an Internal Revenue Service agent as-
signed to an IRS office in California, alleged a pattern of harass-
ment by a co-worker, Sterling Gray.220 Gray, who held no
supervisory authority over Ellison, had allegedly sought to de-
velop a personal relationship with the plaintiff and asked her
for a date.221 Gray was told by Ellison that she was "not inter-
ested" in developing a personal relationship. 222 Gray persisted
in his attempts to develop the relationship, and his efforts in-
cluded "bizarre" pleas in notes and letters to the plaintiff.22
3
The communications, making clear references to sex, clearly
"frightened" the plaintiff.224 In fact, the plaintiff used terms
such as "frightened" and "frantic" to describe her emotional re-
action to the advances of Gray.225 However, despite the bizarre
conduct, there was "no evidence that Gray harbored ill-will to-
ward Elison."226 The circuit court refused to employ the strict
adherence to the severity and persuasiveness standard, stating
frankly: "We do not agree with the standards set forth in Scott
and Rabidue, and we choose not to follow those decisions."227
The court viewed the strict approach employed in Scott and
Rabidue as improperly focusing upon the severity of the out-
come of the harassment and requiring, as a precondition to re-
lief, that the plaintiff's psychological well-being be seriously
affected. The Ellison court stated:
ness taken by another group of post-Vinson courts. See supra note 219 and accom-
panying text.
219 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991). See also Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895
F.2d 1469, 1484 (3d Cir. 1990); Carrero v. New York City Housing Authority, 890
F.2d 569, 578 (2d Cir. 1989); Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 898
(1st Cir. 1988).
220 Ellison, 924 F.2d at 873
221 Id. at 873-74.
222 Id.
223 Id. at 874.
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 Ellison, 924 F.2d at 880.
227 Id. at 877.
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Neither Scott's search for 'anxiety and debilitation' sufficient to
'poison' a working environment nor Rabidue's requirement that a
plaintiff's psychological well-being be 'seriously affected' follow di-
rectly from language in Meritor[Savings Bank v. Vinson]. It is the
harasser's conduct which must be pervasive or severe, not the al-
teration of the conditions of employment. Surely, employees need
not endure sexual harassment until their psychological well-being
is seriously affected to the extent that they suffer anxiety and
debilitation. 228
The Ellison court further held that, "[a]lthough an isolated
epithet by itself fails to support a cause of action for hostile en-
vironment, Title VII's protection of employees from sex discrim-
ination comes into play long before the point where victims of
sexual harassment require psychiatric assistance."
229
In the effort to evaluate the severity or pervasiveness of the
sexual harassment, the Ellison court determined that a "focus
on the perspective of the victim" was necessary. 230 The court
stated:
If we only examined whether a reasonable person would engage in
allegedly harassing conduct, we would run the risk of reinforcing
the prevailing level of discrimination. Harassers could continue
to harass merely because a particular discriminatory practice was
common, and victims of harassment would have no remedy.
231
In the particular case, focusing on the victim's perspective re-
quired the application of a reasonable woman standard rather
that the reasonable person standard used in other cases such as
Rabidue. The Ellison court adopted the reasonable woman
standard primarily because the court believed "a sex-blind rea-
sonable person standard tends to be male-biased and tends to
systematically ignore the experiences of women."232 The court
stated further "[clonduct that many men consider unobjection-
228 Id. at 877-78.
229 Id. at 878.
230 Id. See also Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir.
1990); Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir. 1987); Lipsett v. University
of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 898 (1st Cir. 1988); Smolsky v. Consolidated Rail
Corp., 780 F.Supp. 283, 294 (E.D.Pa. 1991); Harris v. International Paper Co., 765
F.Supp. 1509, 1515 (D.Me. 1991); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760
F.Supp. 1486 (M.D.Fla. 1991).
231 Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878.
232 Id. at 879.
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able may offend many women."233 The Ellison court deter-
mined that a woman plaintiff would state a prima facie case of
hostile environment sexual harassment "when she alleges con-
duct which a reasonable woman would consider sufficiently se-
vere or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and
create an abusive working environment."23 4
The United States Supreme Court reconsidered the central
issue regarding the nature of sufficient severity and pervasive-
ness in its second, and, to date, only other sexual harassment
decision, Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.23 5 In Harris, the Court
reviewed an appeal from the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals,
which had applied the strict, psychological injury requirement
set out in Rabidue.23 6 The Supreme Court reaffirmed the Mer-
itor standard requiring actionable sexual harassment to be "suf-
ficiently severe or pervasive."237 However, the Court in Harris
took the position that the Meritor standard set "a middle path
between making actionable any conduct that is merely offensive
and requiring the conduct to cause a tangible psychological in-
jury."238 Sexual harassment, the court stated, is actionable
"before the harassing conduct leads to a nervous breakdown."
239
It is error to rely upon a showing of psychological injury as a
precondition to establishing actionable sexual harassment:
Such an inquiry may needlessly focus the factfinder's attention on
concrete psychological harm, an element Title VII does not re-
quire. Certainly Title VII bars conduct that would seriously affect
a reasonable person's psychological well-being, but the statute is
not limited to such conduct. So long as the environment would
reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive,
there is no need for it also to be psychologically injurious. 240
While the Court in Harris made it clear that psychological
injury need not be established for the plaintiff to prevail, the
Court failed to conclusively define the nature of hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment. The Court acknowledged that hostile
233 Id. at 878.
234 Id.
235 114 S.Ct. 367 (1993).
236 Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 976 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1992).
237 Id. at 370.
238 Id.
239 Id. at 371.
240 id
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environment sexual harassment "by its nature" cannot be the
subject of"a mathematically precise test."241 Instead, the Court
stated, an hostile environment must be determined by looking
to "all the circumstances," including the frequency and severity
of the harassing conduct; whether the conduct is physically
threatening or humiliating, or merely offensive; and whether
the conduct unreasonably interferes with the work performance
of the employee. 242 Psychological injury is relevant to the exist-
ence of hostile environment sexual harassment, but it is only
one factor to be considered along with the others. 243
Additionally, in searching for hostile environment sexual
harassment, the Court in Harris made it clear that both objec-
tive and subjective elements are a proper part of the case analy-
sis. The complained of conduct must establish an objectively
hostile environment, and the victim of the harassment must
subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive.244 The
Court failed to decide in Harris the question of the degree of
appropriate attention that should be applied in considering the
objective element. In other words, the Court did not directly
address whether the Ellison "reasonable victim" standard,245 or
the more traditional "reasonable person" standard, should ap-
ply to the analysis. However, the Court did use the "reasonable
person" language in the its opinion, even though the Court did
not expressly decide the issue. For example, the Court stated,
"[clonduct that is not severe enough or pervasive enough to cre-
ate an objectively hostile or abusive work environment - an en-
vironment that a reasonable person would find hostile or
abusive - is beyond Title VII's purview."246 At another point in
its decision, after holding that psychological harm need not be
shown as a precondition to actionable sexual harassment under
Title VII, the Court stated that Title VII "[c]ertainly ... bars
241 Harris, 114 S.Ct. at 372.
242 Id. at 371. See also Baskerville v. Culligan Intern. Co., 50 F.3d 428, 594
(7th Cir. 1995) ("In determining whether a working environment is 'hostile' or
'abusive', all the circumstances may be considered," including, specifically, those
listed in Harris).
?AS Id.
244 Id See Dey v. Colt Construction & Dev'l. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1454 (7th Cir.
1994) ("Harris ... makes clear that we must evaluate the relevant factors from
both an objective and subjective viewpoint.").
245 See supra notes 230-34 and accompanying text.
2" Harris, 114 S.Ct. at 370 (emphasis added).
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conduct that would seriously affect a reasonable person's psy-
chological well-being."247 This language has led some lower
courts to conclude that the Supreme Court favors the reason-
able person standard.248 Other post-Harris lower courts, how-
ever, have simply determined that "Harris did not explicitly
decide whether a reasonable person or reasonable woman (or
victim) standard applies."249 The issue will not be resolved un-
til ultimately re-visited and decided by the Supreme Court.
B. Doctrinal Development in Canada
Post-Janzen tribunals have commonly cited the Janzen de-
cision for the proposition that sexual harassment is a form of
illegal sex discrimination.250 The tribunals also have adhered
to the broad definition of actionable sexual harassment supplied
by the Canadian Supreme Court in Janzen. The adherence of
the lower tribunals to a broad definition is often exemplified by
the tribunals' citation to the following language of then-Chief
Justice Dickson, writing for the majority in Janzen:
247 Id. at 371 (emphasis added). See supra text accompanying note 242.
24s See Baskerville v. Culligan Intern. Co., 50 F.3d 428, 594 (7th Cir. 1995)
("The test is an objective one, not a standard of offense to a 'reasonable woman'.");
Dey v. Colt Construction & Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1454 (7th Cir. 1994).
249 Currie v. Kowalewski, 824 F.Supp. 57, 59 (N.D.N.Y. 1994). See also Fuller
v. City of Oakland, Cal., 47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir. 1995) ("Whether the work-
place is objectively hostile must be determined from the perspective of a reason-
able person with the same fundamental characteristics.") (emphasis added); West
v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 753 (3d Cir. 1995) (To be actionable, the
discrimination must "have detrimentally affected a reasonable person of the same
protected class in that position.").
250 See Crozier v. Asselstine, 22 C.H.R.R. D/244, D/246 (Ont. Bd. Inq. 1994);
Vanton v. British Columbia Council of Human Rights, 21 C.H.R.R. D/492, D/499
(B.C. Sup.Ct. 1994) ("It is beyond doubt that sexual harassment constitutes dis-
crimination based on sex."); Veitenheimer v. Orange Properties Ltd., 20 C.H.R.R.
D/462, D/465 (Sask. Bd. Inq. 1992); Wagner v. Kersey-Reimer Enterprises Ltd., 15
C.H.R.R. D/413, D/415 (B.C. H. R. Council 1991) ("It is well settled that sexual
harassment constitutes sex discrimination within the meaning of human rights
legislation, citing Janzen.); McLellan v. Mentor Investments Ltd., 15 C.H.R.R. D/
134, D/135 (N.S. Bd. Inq. 1991); Karlenzigv. Chris' Holdings Ltd., 15 C.H.R.R. D/5,
D/7 (Sask. Bd. Inq. 1991); Janzen v. British Columbia, 14 C.H.R.R. D/257, D/260
(B.C. H. R. Council 1991); Primack v. Azim Enterprises Co., 14 C.H.R.R. D/150, D/
153 (B.C. H. R. Council 1991) ("The [Janen] Court then affirmed that sexual har-
assment constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex within the meaning of
human rights legislation."); Shaw v. Levac Supply Ltd., 14 C.H.R.R. D/36, D/53
(Ont. Bd. Inq. 1990).
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I am of the view that sexual harassment in the workplace may be
broadly defined as unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature that det-
rimentally affects the work environment or leads to adverse job-
related consequences for the victims of harassment. It is, as Adju-
dicator Shime observed in Bell v. Ladas,.. ., and has been widely
accepted by other adjudicators and academic commentators, an
abuse of power. When sexual harassment occurs in the work-
place, it is an abuse of both economic and sexual power. Sexual
harassment is a demeaning practice, one that constitutes a
profound affront to the dignity of the employees forced to endure
it. By requiring an employee to contend with unwelcome sexual
actions or explicit sexual demands, sexual harassment in the work-
place attacks the dignity and self-respect of the victim both as an
employee and as a human being.251
In White v. Nu-Way Cleaners Ltd.,252 the British Columbia
Council of Human Rights stated, "lilt is clear from these state-
ments [in Janzen] that the Supreme Court of Canada requires a
broad definition of sexual harassment ... "253 In Shaw v. Levac
Supply Ltd.,254 the Ontario Board of Inquiry stated:
The words emphasized in the passages quoted earlier from
the Janzen case,. . . , would seem to indicate that the 'broad defi-
nition' laid down in that case extends to some of the behaviour
that occurred in the case before me. According to the guidelines
established by the American Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, verbal conduct of a sexual nature will constitute sex-
ual harassment when such conduct has the effect of creating an
offensive working environment. After citing that guideline with
approval, Chief Justice Dickson [writing for the Court in Janzen]
went on to say that sexual harassment may take a variety of
forms and that it encompasses inappropriate comments. 255
251 Janzen v. Platy Enterprises Ltd., 59 D.L.R.4th 352, 375 (Can. 1989) (em-
phasis added) (citation omitted). See Aavik v. Ashbourne, 12 C.H.R.R. D/401, D/
408 (Nfld. H. R. Comm. 1990).
252 14 C.H.R.R. D/443 (B.C. H. R. Council 1991).
253 Id. at D/448. See also Vanton v. British Columbia Council of Human
Rights, 21 C.H.R.R. D/492, D/499 (B.C. Sup.Ct. 1994) ("In the Janzen decision the
Supreme Court of Canada defined 'sexual harassment' broadly ..."); Karlenzig v.
Chris' Holdings Ltd., 15 C.H.R.R. D/5, D/8 (Sask. Bd. Inq. 1991) ("In Janzen v.
Platy Enterprises Ltd., supra, Chief Justice Dickson indicated that sexual harass-
ment in the workplace should be broadly defined...
254 14 C.H.R.R. D/36 (Ont. Bd. Inq. 1990).
255 Id. at D/54. The Board of Inquiry in Shaw went on to find that the specific
conduct before it, while not involving the more common activities of sexual solicita-
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It is now well-settled in Canada that sexual harassment in-
volves "unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature that detrimen-
tally affects the work environment or leads to adverse job-
related consequences for the victims of the harassment."256
It is remarkable that, beginning with the first Canadian de-
cision in 1980 equating sexual harassment with prohibited sex
discrimination, 257 there has been general adherence to the prin-
ciple that sexual harassment requires a broad definition.258
Janzen provided the ultimate stamp of approval to this princi-
ple of liberality, and post-Janzen decisions have continued to
apply a standard which finds actionable unwelcome sexual con-
duct. Even in those, "situations in which sexual demands are
foisted upon unwilling employees or in which employees must
endure sexual groping, propositions, and inappropriate com-
ments, but where no tangible economic rewards are attached to
involvement in the behaviour."259 What we commonly call in
the United States a hostile environment (and what Canadians
tend to call a "poisoned work environment") serves as a basis for
actionable sexual harassment in post-Janzen Canada. 260
tion and sexually-oriented touchings, involved conduct which denigrated the com-
plainant's sexuality as a woman (a co-employee called the complainant a "fat cow";
she was made fun of for the way she walked and for her figure) and amounted to
actionable sexual harassment.
256 Janzen, 59 D.L.R.4th at 375. See Vanton v. British Columbia, 21 C.H.R.R.
D/492, D/499 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1994); Arbogast v. Empire-Int'l. Investment Corp., 20
C.H.R.R. D/150, D/154 (B.C. H. R. Council 1993) ("It is well-established that un-
welcome conduct of a sexual nature that detrimentally affects the work environ-
ment of an employee constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex; it is no defence
that only some employees are subjected to the sexual harassment." (citing Janzen,
59 D.L.R.4th at 375.)).
257 Re Bell and Korczak, 27 L.A.C.2d 227, 1 C.H.R.R. D/155 (Ont. Bd. of Inq.
1980), sub nom. Bell v. Ladas.
258 Of course, the aberration is Manitoba Court of Appeal decision, Janzen v.
Platy Enterprises Ltd., 59 D.L.R.4th 352, 10 C.H.R.R. D/3831 (Man.C.A. 1986),
rev'd 59 D.L.R.4th 352, 10 C.H.R.R. D/6205 (Can. 1989).
259 Janzen, 10 C.H.R.R. at D/6226.
260 See Bruce v. McGuire Truck Stop, 20 C.H.R.R. D/145, D/147 (Ont. Bd. of
Inq. 1993) ("There is now substantial human rights jurisprudence which estab-
lishes that a poisoned work environment can amount to discrimination . . .");
Kotyk v. Canadian Employment & Immigration Comm'n., 4 C.H.R.R. D/1416, D/
1428 (Can. H. R. Comm'n. 1983) (Can. 1983) ("Even if I were to find that there was
no concrete employment consequences, there is no question but that her environ-
ment was 'poisoned.' ").
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As in the United States,261 for workplace sexual harass-
ment to be actionable, the complained of conduct in a Canadian
case must be "unwelcome" to the complainant. 262 An excellent,
post-Janzen case discussing the issue of unwelcome conduct is
Dupuis v. British Columbia.263 In Dupuis, the tribunal consid-
ered whether illegal sexual harassment had occurred even
though the complainant had voluntarily entered into sexual in-
tercourse with her supervisor. The tribunal cited Meritor Sav-
ings Bank v. Vinson264 to support its position that voluntary
conduct by the complainant is not determinative on the issue of
unwelcomeness. 265 The tribunal stated that "Iv]oluntariness is
merely a fact to consider in determining whether the conduct
was unwelcome."26 6 In determining whether the conduct was
unwelcome, "[e]vidence that the complainant explicitly put the
alleged harasser on notice that the conduct was unwelcome will
be very persuasive."267 However, the tribunal stated, "indica-
tion of unwelcomeness may be implicit; an overt refusal may not
be necessary."268 For example, the complainant's "body lan-
guage can suffice to demonstrate objection." 269 The tribunal in
Dupuis further stated:
Though a protest is strong evidence, it is not a necessary element
in a claim of sexual harassment. Fear of repercussions may pre-
vent a person in a position of weakness from protesting. A victim
of harassment need not confront the harasser directly so long as
261 See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
262 Janzen v. Platy Enterprises Ltd., 59 D.L.R.4th 352, 375 (Can. 1989)
("(S)exual harassment in the workplace may be broadly defined as unwelcome con-
duct of a sexual nature that detrimentally affects the work environment or leads to
adverse job-related consequences for the victims of harassment.") (emphasis
added).
263 20 C.H.R.R. D/87 (B.C. H. R. Council 1993).
264 477 U.S. 57 (1986), aff'd Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985),
rev'd 23 Fair Empl. Cas. (BNA) 37 (D.D.C. 1980).
265 Dupuis, 20 C.H.R.R. at D/93. The tribunal also cited Dyson v. Louie Pasin
Plaster & Stucco Ltd., 11 C.H.R.R. D/495 (B.C. H. R. Council 1990). See also Que-
bec (Comm. des droits de la personne) v. Habachi, 18 C.H.R.R. D/485, D/493 (Que.
H. R. Tribunal 1992).
266 Dupuis, 20 C.H.R.R. at D/93.
267 Id.
268 Id.
269 Id.
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her conduct demonstrates explicitly or implicitly that the sexual
conduct is unwelcome. 2 7
0
The tribunal also stated that a two-part standard must be em-
ployed to determine unwelcomeness. The standard requires
that the trier of fact first "assess, whether, considering all the
circumstances," the complainant's conduct was "consistent with
her allegation that the conduct was unwelcome," and, second,
assess "whether there is evidence that the alleged harasser
knew or ought to have known that the conduct was
unwelcome." 2 71
Of course, as in United States law,27 2 not all unwelcome
conduct is necessarily actionable in Canada as a form of prohib-
ited sexual harassment. The issue was framed in a frank and
effective manner in the post-Janzen decision A. v. Quality
Inn,2 73 when the Ontario Board of Inquiry held:
It seems axiomatic that not all behaviour between adult males
and females in the workplace is sexual harassment; that is, hav-
ing males and females together in one place does not, in itself,
constitute sexual harassment. By the same token, having males
and females together does create a sexually charged atmosphere.
The Victorians recognized this and even covered table legs to shel-
ter those entering a room from being exposed to 'bare legs' and
thus be embarrassed by the resulting imaginings that might fol-
low. It is also clear that in present day society there have been
many incidents where female employees have been raped and fon-
dled and made the butt of jokes because of their femaleness.
Males and females in our society are now attempting to draw a
line between an acceptable level of recognition that when people
are together a certain amount of comaraderie exists, often with
sexual overtones, and on the other hand, a recognition that fe-
males are often vulnerable in their employment situation and this
270 Id. at D/94. See also, Anderson v. Guyett, 11 C.H.R.R. D/415 (B.C. H. R.
Council 1990).
271 Dupuis, 20 C.H.R.R. at D/94. See also Contenti v. Gold Seats Inc., 20
C.H.R.R. D/74, D/79 (Alta. Bd. of Inq. 1992) ("It is often stated as an objective, or
'reasonableness,' standard, that the harasser 'knew or ought to have known' that
his conduct was unwelcome to the complainant.").
272 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
273 20 C.H.R.R. D/230 (Ont. Bd. of Inq. 1993).
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vulnerability can lead to sexual exploitation. The drawing of new
boundaries is always a difficult and delicate matter.27
4
While drawing the appropriate boundary between accepta-
ble and unacceptable workplace conduct is, indeed, a difficult
task, as a Newfoundland Ad Hoc Human Rights Commission
explained, "[t]here is, however, some line [to be crossed] where
... bad taste will constitute harassment."275 In Aragona v. Ele-
gant Lamp Co.,276 a pre-Janzen Ontario Board of Inquiry found
that the line is crossed "only where the conduct may be reason-
ably construed to create, as a condition of employment, a work
environment which demands an unwarranted intrusion upon
the employee's sexual dignity as a man or a woman."277 The
emphasis in Canadian jurisprudence upon a judicial search for
an unwarranted intrusion upon the employee's sexual dignity is
strong and continues. For example, in the post-Janzen decision
Bouvier v. Metro Express,278 the Canadian Human Rights Com-
mission held:
In short, sexual harassment consists in unwelcome behaviour of a
sexual nature which is an affront to the personal dignity of an-
other person. It may be blatant or subtle, and may take many
forms, but the evidentiary burden on the victim is only that of
establishing that the conduct complained of was (1) of a sexual
nature, (2) unwanted and (3) humiliating. 279
In Bouvier, the commission found that the complainant had en-
dured frequent comments of a sexual nature from her superior
for over three months. Her superior had commented on the
complainant's "nice legs," recommended that the complainant
dress in a particular manner and put on a bikini, made dirty
jokes concerning the complainant's undergarments, and invited
the complainant to "get it on." He had also made sexually-ori-
ented gestures toward the complainant, such as undoing a but-
274 Id. at D/234. Compare with a recent American case, Baskerville v. Culligan
Intern. Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995) ("The concept of sexual harassment is
designed to protect working women from the kind of male attentions that can
make the workplace hellish for women ..... It is not designed to purge the work-
place of vulgarity. Drawing the line is not always easy.").
275 Aavik v. Ashvourne, 12 C.H.R.R. D/401, D/409 (Nfld. H. R. Comm'n 1990).
276 3 C.H.R.R. D/1109 (Ont. Bd. of Inq. 1982).
277 Id. at D/1110 (emphasis added).
278 17 C.H.R.R. D/313 (Can. H. R. Trib. 1992).
279 Id. at D/326.
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ton on her blouse, stroking her thigh, and slapping her on the
buttocks.28 0 The slapping, the commission stated, was "an ex-
tremely humiliating incident which finally brought about the
complainant's departure" from the job.2 8l The Commission
stated that "[tihe comments and gestures were thus clearly sex-
ual in nature; they were humiliating or offensive to the com-
plainant; and they were unwanted."2 2 The Commission found
that "there is no doubt that the complainant was sexually
harassed."28 3
In determining the existence of actionable sexual harass-
ment in the context of the hostile or "poisoned" work environ-
ment, Canadian tribunals do generally require evidence which
establishes a "course" of conduct. 28 4 As in the United States, 285
singular or isolated instances may be sufficiently severe to be
actionable. 286 However, also as in the United States,28 7 re-
peated incidents normally provide better evidence of an actiona-
ble claim of hostile environment, although the strength of the
evidence in a case generally depends upon the number of inci-
dents presented and the intensity of each incident. The British
Columbia Council of Human Rights presented the commonly-
shared principle well in the post-Vinson decision Wagner v. Ker-
sey-Reimer Enterprises Ltd.288 In Wagner, the tribunal refer-
enced approvingly to a Harvard Law Review article, and,
quoting the article stated:
'... a finding that offensive conduct is a condition of the workplace
should require a showing that such conduct occurs with some fre-
quency. Nevertheless, because the effect of only one or a few
physical advances or threats may be as devastating as that of re-
280 Id. at D/326-27.
281 Id. at D/327.
282 Id.
283 Id. at D/326.
284 See Aavik v. Ashbourne, 12 C.H.R.R. D/401. D/409 (Nfdl. Ad Hoc H.R.
Comm'n 1990) (I am not persuaded that the evidence establishes a 'course' of con-
duct such as would constitute 'harass[ment].' ").
28 See supra note 170.
28M See Bruce v. McGuire Truck Stop, 20 C.H.R.R. D/145, D/147 (Ont. Bd. of
Inq. 1993) (""(T)his Board would find the single outrageous event of the showing of
the pornographic film in full view of the young unsuspecting complainants in the
workplace sufficient to constitute a course of conduct amounting to harassment.").
287 See supra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
288 15 C.H.R.R. D/413 (B.C. Council of H.R. 1991).
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peated sexual propositions and innuendoes, the threshold for de-
termining whether there has been repeated exposure should vary
inversely with the offensiveness of the incidents.' 28 9
In assessing the evidence of sexual harassment, Canadian
courts consistently employ an objective standard.290 Aijun P.
Aggarwal, Canada's foremost authority on sexual harassment
law, explains the Canadian approach:
Whether or not the alleged sexual conduct or behaviour consti-
tutes sexual harassment must be determined by an objective test.
For an objective test, the courts and tribunals have used the stan-
dard of a 'reasonable person' rather than the perception of a
harassee or a harasser. Moreover, the conduct in question should
be examined and tested against the norm of 'socially acceptable
behaviour' and the 'reasonable and usual limits of social interac-
tion' in the community.291
The "reasonable person" measure, then, is the standard com-
monly employed in Canada.292 However, this does not mean
that the reasonable victim standard has not found its way into
the Canadian jurisprudence. The impressive influence of Amer-
ican law on the development of Canadian sexual harassment
law made such an event unavoidable. In 1993, in Stadnyk v.
Canada (Employment and Immigration Commission),293 the
Canadian Human Rights Tribunal was presented specifically
with the Ninth Circuit's decision in Ellison v. Brady, 294 to assist
the tribunal with its determination of a case in which the tribu-
nal believed that the complainant "was genuinely offended and
289 Id. at D/416 (quoting Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work En-
vironment under Title VII," 97 HARv. L. REV. 1449, 1458-9).
290 See Lamers v. Pacific Building Maintenance Ltd., 14 C.H.R.R. D/235, D/242
(Sask. Bd. of Inq. 1991) (...this Board must assess the evidence by way of an
objective standard .... ").
291 Arjun P. Aggarwal, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE 122 (1992).
292 See Barnes v. Thomas Stratton Warehousing Co. Inc., 22 C.H.R.R. D/427,
D/433 (Nfld. Bd. of Inq. 1993); Dupuis v. British Columbia (Ministry of Forests), 20
C.H.R.R. D/87, D95 (B.C. H. R. Council 1993); Broadfield v. DeHavilland/Boeing of
Canada Ltd., 19 C.H.R.R. D/347, D/366 (Ont. Bd. of Inq. 1993). See also Deborah
Ann Campbell, THE EVOLUTION OF SExuAL HARASSMENT CASE LAW IN CANADA 16
(1992) ("The conduct must be of a certain offensiveness and frequency, as judged
by a reasonable person, such that it constitutes a term or condition of employment,
in order to constitute [actionable] sexual harassment.") (emphasis added).
293 22 C.H.R.R. D/173 (Can. H. R. Tribunal 1993).
294 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991). See supra notes and accompanying text.
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sincerely believes that she was attacked and discriminated
against because of her stance on, and experience with, sexual
harassment."295 Raymond W. Kirzinger, writing on behalf of
the Commission, said:
The courts have been equally clear in stating that the subjective
perception of discrimination on the part of the complainant is not
sufficient of itself to substantiate a claim. Some reasonable and
objective standard must be applied to the language, words, or con-
duct complained of.296
As to the application of the principal epitomized in the Ellison
case, Chairman Kirzinger stated:
I am not aware that the Ellison case, .. ., has been considered or
adopted by any Canadian court, or for that matter, that the rea-
sonable victim standard has been adopted. However, in this par-
ticular case, I believe it is appropriate to consider the application
of such an approach since we are dealing with a complainant who
appears to have been extremely sensitive about any sexual har-
assment comments.297
The Commission proceeded to apply the reasonable victim stan-
dard in the case and, nevertheless, concluded that the com-
plained of conduct was not offensive. The Commission
"unequivocally" believed that the complainant fit the definition
of the "rare hyper-sensitive employee, "and that "a reasonable
female" would not have been offended.298 In 1995, in reviewing
the Stadnyk decision, the Canadian Human Rights Review Tri-
bunal stated, "[s]uch standard was adopted by the initial Tribu-
nal..., and we do not find any error in the application of such
standard by the Tribunal Chairperson to the evidence and facts
as found by him."299
Of course, even if a "reasonable person," rather than a "rea-
sonable victim, standard is used, that standard requires a con-
sideration of the particular context within which the alleged
misconduct occurred. Professor Aggarwal makes two key points
in this regard: First, "[t]he trier of fact must 'adopt the perspec-
295 Stadnyk, 22 C.H.R.R. at D/191
296 Id. at D/191-92.
297 Id. at D/193.
298 Id. at D/193-94.
299 Stadnyk v. Canada (Employment and Immigration Comm.), 22 C.H.R.R. D/
196, D/201 (Can. H. R. Rev. Trib. 1995).
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tive of a reasonable person's reaction to a similar environment
under similar or like circumstances';" and second, "the 'reason-
able person' standard should consider the victim's perspective
and not stereotypical notions of acceptable behaviour."300 This
"reasonable person" perspective arguably mandates a reason-
able victim analysis in evaluating the evidence. Finally, Cana-
dian tribunals also commonly employ a reasonable person
approach to determine whether the requisite unwelcomeness
exists in a given case. For example, in Dupuis v. British Colum-
bia,30 ' the British Columbia Human Rights Council stated:
While the perception of the alleged harasser is relevant in deter-
mining whether the conduct was unwelcome, the proper question
to ask is whether a reasonable person would recognize that the
conduct in those circumstances was unwelcome. What is reason-
able will depend on all the circumstances, including the nature of
the impugned conduct and the relationship.
30 2
As with doctrinal development in the post-Vinson United
States,30 3 post-Janzen Canadian tribunals have considered the
existence of both overtly sexual and non-sexual harassment in
determining the existence of actionable sexual harassment.
The first Canadian tribunal to deal with the precise issue of
whether negative and demeaning comments can amount to sex-
ual harassment was the Ontario Board of Inquiry. The tribunal
300 Arjun P. Aggarwal, SExUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE 73 (1992)
(quoting the American cases, Highlander v. K.F.C. Natl Management Co., 805
F.2d 644, 650 (6th Cir. 1986) and Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 626, respectively).
301 20 C.H.R.R. D/87 (B.C. H. R. Council 1993).
302 Id. at D/95. See also Egolf v. Watson, 23 C.H.R.R. D/4, D/17 (B.C. H. R.
Council 1995) ("A reasonable person in Watson's [Respondent's] position ought to
have realized that his conduct would be offensive to female employees."); Barnes v.
Thomas Stratton Warehousing Co. Inc., 22 C.H.R.R. D/427, D/433 (Nfdl. Bd. of Inq.
1993) ("The issue then is whether a reasonable person in the place of the respon-
dent would have known the comments were unwelcome."); Contenti v. Gold Seats
Inc., 20 C.H.R.R. D/74, D/79 (Alta. Bd. of Inq. 1992) ("It is often stated as an objec-
tive, or 'reasonableness,' standard, that the harasser 'knew or ought to have
known' that his conduct was unwelcome to the complainant.") (citing Janzen, 10
C.H.R.R. at D/6210); Butt v. Smith, 20 C.H.R.R. D/39, D/44 (Nfdl. Bd. of Inq. 1992)
(conduct not the type that "ought reasonably to have been known to be unwel-
come."); Lampman v. Photoflair, 18 C.H.R.R. D/196, D/208 (Ont. Bd. of Inq. 1992)
("(I)t must be considered whether Mr. Smith (the alleged harasser) knew or ought
reasonably to have known that his conduct, in these various incidents, was
unwelcome.").
303 See supra notes 172-79 and accompanying text.
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did so in a post-Janzen 1990 decision, Shaw v. Levac Supply
Ltd.30 4 The complainant in Shaw had been consistently
lampooned, mimicked, and ridiculed by a co-worker for being fat
and unattractive. However, the complainant had not exper-
ienced overtly sexual demands or solicitations in the workplace.
The tribunal stated:
The question whether negative and demeaning comments of a
sexual nature can amount to sexual harassment does not appear
to have come before any Canadian court or human rights tribunal
until now. Thus, it is not surprising that the discussion leading
up to the definition formulated in the Supreme Court [in Janzen]
concentrates on sexual activity involving demands or solicita-
tions, since that was the factual context of the cases considered.
However, since legal definition depends as much upon deduction
from principle and policy as it does upon induction from the facts
of past cases, it does not follow that the meaning of sexual harass-
ment cannot extend to circumstances of a kind not yet
considered. 30 5
The tribunal, relying heavily on the language in Janzen to the
effect that sexual harassment may take a variety of forms and
encompasses inappropriate comments,30 6 found that the con-
duct in the case was actionable workplace sexual harassment.
The tribunal held:
If such conduct is unwelcome and detrimentally affects the cli-
mate of the workplace and the climate of understanding and mu-
tual respect which the legislation seeks to foster, and if such
behaviour is an integral part of a course of conduct that drives its
victim away by attacking her dignity and self-respect both as an
employee and as a human being, can it be said that it is not sexual
harassment merely because the harasser was not making a sex-
ual advance or solicitation? In my opinion such conduct is a form
of sexual harassment .... 307
The issue was re-visited by the Ontario Board of Inquiry in
1993, in Broadfield v. De Havilland/Boeing of Canaday Ltd.30 8
The complainant in Broadfield was the first female supervisor
304 14 C.H.R.R. D/36 (Ont. Bd. of Inq. 1990).
305 Id. at D/53.
306 Id. at D/54.
307 Id. at D/55.
3Ms 19 C.H.R.R. D/347 (Ont. Bd. of Inq. 1993).
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on an industrial plant floor. She was subjected to a course of
severely abusive workplace conduct. The conduct included
anonymous and obscene telephone calls and threats, the com-
plainant's car was vandalized, and the complainant was the ob-
ject of obscene comments. The tribunal determined that the
workplace conduct was directed toward degrading the com-
plainant because of her gender, and in this context was suffi-
ciently pervasive to create a hostile working environment "as a
virtual condition of her employment."30 9
VI. CONCLUSION
Workplace sexual harassment law doctrine in Canada and
the United States has matured considerably in the post-Vinson
and postJanzen periods. This is not to say that further devel-
opment is unnecessary. Issues remain to be clarified.3 10 Also,
the nature of workplace sexual harassment is not susceptible to
precise definition, 311 so questions regarding the appropriate-
ness of workplace conduct in particular instances will remain.
Nevertheless, the maturation permits the representation of
three underlying notions which emerge from the review of the
doctrinal development concerning the nature of actionable
workplace sexual harassment.
First, the general scope of actionable workplace sexual har-
assment in both countries is similar. While the Canadian
Supreme Court in Janzen found the American categorization of
the quid pro quo and hostile environment types of sexual har-
assment unhelpful, 31 2 the reality is that both forms of sexual
309 Id.at D/366. See also Egolf v. Watson, 23 C.H.R.R. D/4, D/17 (B.C. H. R.
Council 1995) ("It is clear.. ., that conduct which denigrates a woman's sexuality
or vexaious conduct which is directed at a woman because of her sex constitutes
sexual harassment."); Bailey v. Anmore (Village), 19 C.H.R.R. D/369, D/375 (B.C.
Council of H.R. 1992) ("(I)t is not necessary that the conduct be overtly sexual; if
the conduct is gender related such that it would not be directed at the other sex it
may also fall within this definition of actionable sexual harassment).").
310 For example, the question of the appropriateness of the reasonable victim
standard still remains an issue in the United States, even after Harris. See supra
notes 248-49 and accompanying text. Additionally, the issue of the extension of
the reasonable victim standard to Canada is in issue after Stadnyk. See supra
notes 293-99 and accompanying text.
311 See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 114 S.Ct. 367, 372 (1993) (Hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment "by its nature" cannot be the subject of"a mathemati-
cally precise test.").
312 See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
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harassment are illegal under the prevailing law of both coun-
tries. The categorization was deemed by the Canadian Court to
be unhelpful only because, by the time Janzen was decided, Ca-
nadian and American doctrinal development had evolved be-
yond the point at which there could be a reasonable debate
concerning the applicability of both types as forms of illegal sex-
ual harassment. The Canadian Supreme Court was correct in
Janzen, "[tihe main point in allegations of sexual harassment is
that unwelcome sexual conduct has invaded the workplace, ir-
respective of whether the consequences of the harassment in-
cluded a denial of concrete employment rewards for refusing to
participate in sexual activity."313 It is laudable that both coun-
tries' doctrines today rest squarely upon this cardinal principle.
Second, the influence of American decisional authority
upon the development of Canadian sexual harassment law ju-
risprudence is impressive. From the beginning of the formula-
tion of the law of workplace sexual harassment, Canadian
human rights tribunals and courts have commonly recognized
that the legal theory of sexual harassment owed its first clear
articulation to the American cases.3 14 Additionally, these tribu-
nals frequently considered the United States precedents in
their deliberations, and they often adopted those decisions as
authority for similar Canadian holdings.3 15 For example, the
Canadian Supreme Court, itself, quoted the American Bundy v.
Jackson decision to support its position in Janzen that "sex dis-
crimination within the meaning of Title VII is not limited to dis-
parate treatment founded solely or categorically on gender."3 1 6
Additionally, the reasonable victim standard entered Canadian
jurisprudence via Stadnyk v. Canada (Employment and Immi-
gration Commission),31 7 because the American Ninth Circuit's
Ellison v. Brady318 decision was specifically presented to the
Canadian Human Rights Tribunal in Stadnyk for its considera-
tion in arriving at a determination of the case.3 19
313 Janzen, 10 C.H.R.R. at D/6226 (Can. 1989).
314 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
315 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
316 Janzen, 10 C.H.R.R. at D/6233 (quoting Bundy, 641 F.2d at 942).
317 22 C.H.R.R. D/173 (Can. H. R. Tribunal 1993).
318 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991). See supra notes and accompanying text.
319 See supra notes 293-99 and accompanying text.
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Third, even though a marked influence of American juris-
prudence is evident in the Canadian law, it is a mistake to draw
from that fact the conclusion that Canadian law has developed
in lockstep with American legal development. It has not,3 20 to
the credit of Canadian jurisprudence. Importantly, post-Janzen
Canadian tribunals have been able to avoid what some post-
Vinson American courts could not; that is, a preoccupation with
the concepts of severity and pervasiveness, which led some
American courts to concentrate erroneously upon the psycholog-
ical well-being of the plaintiff and the degree by which that psy-
chological well-being was adversely affected through the
harassment.3 21 It took another decision of the United States
Supreme Court to finally put this inappropriate focus to rest.3 2 2
The Canadian tribunals, instead, have demonstrated more sen-
sitivity toward the general concept of workplace dignity. Cana-
dian tribunals have tended to a greater extent to focus the
review upon the question of whether the conduct in a case pro-
duces an unwarranted intrusion upon the employee's sexual
dignity as a man or woman.323 This search for an unwarranted
intrusion upon the employee's sexual dignity is appropriate,
since, by focusing upon the question of workplace dignity, we
develop a better perception of the role that the prohibition of
sexual harassment plays in the workplace. As the Quebec Com-
mission des Droits de la Personne wrote, the real aim of work-
place sexual harassment law "is not to impose strict rules of
proper conduct upon society, or to interfere in personal rela-
tions, but rather to recall that human beings are equal in worth
and dignity, and therefore owe one another mutual respect." 324
320 See supra the text accompanying note 97, for an example of the lack of lock-
step development.
321 See, e.g., the discussion concerning the Scott and Rabidue decisions, supra
notes 181-208 and accompanying text.
322 Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 114 S.Ct. 367 (1993).
323 See supra notes 276-79 and accompanying text.
324 COMMISSION DES DROITS DE LA PERSONNE DU QUEBEC, GUIDE-
LINES OF THE COMMISSION DES DROIT DE LA PERSONNE DU QUEBEC
IN MATTERS RESPECTING HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE, Res. No.
COM-297-5 (Oct. 9, 1987) (the English translation) (referring to the goal of the
province of Quebec to reduce harassment in the workplace).
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